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THE 'OPERATIONAL CODE' BELIEF SYSTEM OF HUA GUOFENG: CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Terence P. Labrecque

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

THE 'OPERATIONAL CODE' BELIEF SYSTEM OF HUA GUOFENG; CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

Terence P. Labrecque

September 1979

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The objective of this thesis is to identify and define the operational code of Hua Guofeng. Insight into his estimates of situations and a greater understanding of the norms, standards and guidelines which influence his choice of strategy and tactics is gained. The code is constructed from 94 open source, English translations of Hua's speeches and writings.

Findings: 1. Hua views the international system as conflictual

20. (continued)

and protracted. Superpower hegemony is the primary source of this conflict. Third World unity is required to create world peace. 2. Hua views conflict as zero-sum in nature yet, believes it is necessary for the realization of goals. 3. Hua is highly optimistic and is certain that time is China's ally. 4. Hua believes in the predictability and irresistibility of historical development. The role of a leader is to actively guide history in a direction favorable to his people. 5. A highly structured framework is a prerequisite for establishing and achieving goals. 6. Hua advocates thorough preparation prior to any undertaking. 7. Goals are pursued incrementally according to plan. Hua possesses a keen understanding of the nature of power and refrains from acting without adequate strength. 9. Hua's operational code has been consistent over time.

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The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Hua Guofeng; Chairman of the Communist Party and Premier of the State Council, Peoples Republic of China

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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September 1979

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Findings: 1. Hua views the international system as conflictual and protracted. Superpower hegemony is the primary source of this conflict. Third World unity is required to create world peace. 2. Hua views conflict as zero-sum in nature yet, believes it is necessary for the realization of goals. 3. Hua is highly optimistic and is certain that time is China's ally. 4. Hua believes in the predictability and irresistibility of historical development. The role of a leader is to actively guide history in a direction favorable to his people. 5. A highly structured framework is a prerequisite for establishing and achieving goals. Hua advocates thorough preparation prior to any undertaking. 7. Goals are pursued incrementally according to plan. 8. Hua possesses a keen understanding of the nature of power and refrains from acting without adequate strength. 9. Hua's operational code has been consistent over time.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Few would contest the importance of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States' global strategy or in the international system in general. In recent years her leaders have become more pragmatic and appear to be more interested in meaningful participation in and interaction with the international system. Once a strong antagonist of the United States, she now actively pursues a policy of cooperation and exchange with the industrial capabilities of the West. Such changes in policy are of course a function of many variables but one of the most obvious is the change in leadership following Mao Zedong's death.

Hua Guofeng's emergence as a national leader in 1976 took many observers of the Chinese scene by surprise and immediately launched considerable speculation regarding his political strength and future. Chairman Hua is recognized as a balance artist; one able to skillfully judge the relative merits and popularity of issues and most importantly, able to judge the winning side in advance. He appeared to be a compromise figure when he skyrocketed to the post of Premier on 7 April 1976 and again with his appointment to Chairman of the Communist Party of China on 9 October 1976. As a compromise leader he was adjudged by many analysts to be only a temporary figure yet, he has maintained control of both leadership positions. At 57, he is relatively young, while his major rival, Den Xiaoping

is 76 and likely to retire within the next five years or so. Many analysts argue that, although not strong enough to dominate Chinese foreign policy, his position at the top, his youth and his political talents indicate his almost inevitable emergence as uncontested ruler of the Peoples Republic of China for many years to come.

For this reason, Chairman Hua clearly bears examination and study. Relatively little is known about his background and experience. Further, very little is known about his ingrown beliefs, his perceptions of politics and history nor his approach to problem solving which has evolved from his political experience. Admittedly, data for such an undertaking is limited by the nature of Communist society. However, what is available, (public statements), is ideally suited for the development of an operational code. Such a code provides insight into Chairman Hua's perceptions, his philosophical and instrumental beliefs and provides an excellent method for the content analysis of his public statements.

The primary objective of this thesis is to identify and define the operational code of Chairman Hua Guofeng. In so doing, insight into his estimates of particular situations and a greater understanding of the norms, standards and guidelines which influence his choice of strategy and tactics are gained. Another objective is to ascertain the effect, if any, of the death of Mao Zedong and Hua's subsequent rise to power on Hua's operational code.

B. OVERVIEW

In establishing Hua as a desirable candidate for an operational code study, it is imperative to address three major issues: 1) the present uncertainty concerning the high level decision making processes in the Peoples Republic of China, 2) the Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping relationship and 3) the prognosis for Hua's survivability.

1. The ability of western analysts to accurately predict or anticipate Politburo actions is dismal at best. David Bonavia, for example, concedes that analysts are "floundering in their attempts to interpret (let alone forecast) the murky Peking scene." (103:11)

One has but to monitor the ebb and flow of the Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping controversy for a graphic day by day demonstration of uncertainty and confusion on the part of Western analysts. No one really understands that relationship nor the line up of factions within the Politburo. Jurgen Domes hit the nail on the head when he stated, "The machinery of crisis solution and decision making within the Chinese leadership remains shrouded in mystery." (107:473)

2. A rivalry and contention between Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping has been espoused at varying levels of intensity since the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in October 1975. At this conference three different concepts of rural social policy were proposed by: 1) Deng leaning to the right, 2) Jiang Qing leaning to the left and 3) Hua in the middle. (107: 482) This juncture signaled the beginning of Deng's second

political demise and Hua's ascent as a compromise figure.

The rivalry is generally attributed to divergent views associated with the utility of ideology and possibly a festering of revenge on the part of Deng Xiaoping. It spans a broad spectrum, including the approaches to agriculture, modernization of the military, economic incentives and the role of ideological and political work in the social and economic spheres.

Rumors of an imminent showdown between Hua and Deng have been circulating since mid 1977 following Deng's rehabilitation. Most controversies and leadership changes have been viewed from this perspective yet, this "showdown" has never publicly materialized.

It is ludicrous to assume that no differences exist between the two leaders and, in fact, evidence does exist which lends support to the view of a Hua-Deng rift. After all, Hua was the primary benefactor of Deng's 1976 disgrace and occupies a position (Premier) once coveted by Deng. Additionally, he actively participated in the "criticize Deng Xiaoping's counter revolutionary revisionist line" campaign engineered by the Gang of Four. In essence, there is a basis for Deng to harbor some level of animosity toward Hua.

The more current indications of simmering tensions include the demotion of several former Hua allies (Wu Teh, Wang Dongxing) along with an overall trend toward de-Maoization. De-Maoization does not resemble Soviet de-Stalinization of 1954 but rather, is a recent trend which interprets and

utilizes Mao's major contributions in the context of his era and its particular problems, but also recognizes Mao as a senile old man, easily manipulated prior to his death. Such a campaign can only benefit Deng. The public questioning of Mao's mental capacity near the end leaves the Tien An Men demonstrations, Deng's subsequent dismissal and Hua's appointment as Premier open to reexamination and interpretation. Additionally, signs of disagreement are emerging over the utility of China's communal system. This disagreement somewhat parallels the two positions advanced by Hua and Deng in 1975 at the National Conference on Learning from Tachai. The basic issue is collectivism (Hua) versus motivation through individual gain (Deng) and it effects industry as well as agriculture. Certainly the issue is far from resolved:

> "The particularly hard line on agriculture being taken by Hunan province -- where Hua spent much of his working life -- may possibly indicate that he is behind a move to prevent the break-up of production teams (into family oriented enterprises)." (104:15)

Additionally, Radio Changsha has condemned the "tendency to view farm production as being more important than ideological and political work -- an attitude known to be strongly espoused by Deng." (104:15)

Opposing these plausible arguments in support of a Deng-Hua rift are an equally convincing set of arguments which stress the improbability of a showdown.

First, there are three factors which offset the feasibility of Deng vengeance. It was the leftist Gang

of Four led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, not Hua, who organized Deng's downfall. Yet, it was Hua who, in a rather adroit piece of political maneuvering, brought about the purging of the entire Gang of Four. Additionally, Hua supported Deng's reinstatement. Some analysts theorize that Hua and Deng worked together to oust the radical Wang Dongxing (115:10) and that Hua is not a target of the democratization and de-Maoist campaigns. In fact, were the campaigns to culminate in a Politburo showdown, Hua and Deng would be on the same side. (103:10) Deng has gone on record denying the existence of serious disagreement between the two leaders. He publicly praised Hua's abilities and divorced Hua from any direct connection with the Tien An Men incident. (126:3)

The most significant argument belaying a Hua-Deng confrontation is quite simply an overriding need for a semblance of stability and unity. The outbreak of yet another "two-line" struggle would be devastating to China and to the overall goals shared by both leaders.

3. A great deal of speculation has centered on Hua's future since the day he was appointed Acting Premier. (105:156) The prognosis for Hua's survival and the consolidation of power were generally poor because his appointment caught observers by surprise, he was relatively unknown and he was believed to be a compromise choice. Yet, he is not only the only man in history to hold both Chairman of the CCP and Premier of the State Council positions simultaneously, he has done so for three turbulent years. On at least three occasions, analysts

were certain that Hua would surrender at least the Premiership. Yet today, two years after Deng's rehabilitation, one and one half years after the Fifth National Peoples Congress and six months after the brakes were applied to the democratization campaign, Hua retains both positions. Hua has, in a sense, become a symbol of Chinese unity and political stability; such a symbol is not easily discarded. (85:24)

There are other factors, both from Hua's career and his personality which will hold him in good stead vis-a-vis potential political opponents, Deng, in particular. Hua's foremost personal characteristic is his ability to be self-effacing at the right time, an ability shared by China's most survivable leader, Zhou Enlai. This ability, which in Hua's case is also a predilection and a standard practice throughout his career, allows his relationship with the more outgoing and pugnacious Deng (105:160) to be compatible. This quality also makes Hua a more difficult target to attack.

Hua's second most characteristic trait is his flexibility and opportunism. His sudden shift from the Cultural Revolutionary Left (Gang of Four) to the military right, in 1976, demonstrates his ability to accurately read the winds of change and pick the winning side. His ability to balance between rival factions is in evidence throughout his career. He can cooperate and sympathize with all factions, but formally (and irreversibly) identifies with none. For this reason, Hua has been and will continue to be essential as an unobtrusive and highly acceptable compromise choice. It is also for this reason that

Hua remains above intra Politburo factional purging, i.e., former allies may go but Hua remains. (85:24)

Hua has one other very important nonnegotiable advantage: youth. At 57, Hua is almost twenty years Deng's junior. Deng's effective political life can hardly be more than another five years. Essentially, Hua has but to wait out Deng's physical demise. Although formally ranked second, it is generally agreed that Deng currently controls more votes in the Politburo than Hua. (85:24) Yet Hua clearly possesses power and prestige and is serving in a unification role which is absolutely necessary to the success of Deng's modernization policies.

In early 1977, David Bonavia addressed the subject of why Hua would back the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Now, more than two years later, his argument remains relevant and plausible in terms of their political partnership and Hua's future.

> "If he runs true to past form, Hua will continue coming up through the middle by balancing rival factions, and at the moment when he sees the balance tipping decisively in one direction, will throw his weight with it and be rewarded as a result. The reward which Teng (Deng) and his supporters can still offer Hua, even though he is already Chairman and Premier, is security of tenure" and the chance to end his days as the truly accepted and unquestioned leader of the most populous nation on earth. (97:17)

In short, this thesis is predicated upon three assumptions:

1. that Hua Guofeng is a powerful force in the Peoples Republic of China
2. that the prognosis for Hua's uncontested control within five years is very high
3. that Western analysts' current understanding of Chinese political decision making processes is poor.

Given these three assumptions, the relevance of this thesis is guaranteed.

II. HUA GUOFENG BACKGROUND

> "Comrades working in the provinces will sooner or later come to the Centre. Comrades at the Centre will sooner or later either die or leave the scene. Khrushchev came from a local area. At the local level the class struggle is more acute, closer to natural struggle, closer to the masses. This gives the local comrades an advantage over those at the Centre." -- Mao Tse-tung, March, 1958 (116:114)

Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, is the epitome of the above description. Although a rather enigmatic figure, Hua is clearly the vanguard of the second generation of Chinese Communist leadership. Too young for any significant role in the revolutionary years, Hua's career path has been marked by skillful and dependable bureaucratic service and successful transformation into a "political generalist." (130:3)

Although cited as a "rising star" by the World Press in 1973, Hua's elevation to Premier and Chairman in 1976 took most of the world by surprise. His origins, background and beliefs were unknown and remain essentially so to this day. Following his election to the Chairmanship of the CCP in 1976, the Chinese Press launched a rather sporadic campaign designed to alleviate some of the voids associated with Hua's past and generally create an image of closeness and similarity between Hua and Mao Zedong. Probably because the campaign was structured for domestic consumption in an attempt to soothe domestic tension and uncertainty, many of the assertions appear erroneous and pointedly inflated. Oksenberg and Yeung assembled an account of Hua's rise through the Party bureaucracy

prior to the Cultural Revolution by analyzing available issues of the Hsin Hunan Pao (New Hunan Daily) prior to 1960 and monitored Changsha Radio broadcasts from 1963 to 1966. Their work provides the best available glimpse of Hua's early years and indicates that Hua's rise, although certainly remarkable, was not as "meteoric" as first assessed.

Born in 1920, in Shansi province, Hua's early communist years were spent in the Luliang mountain guerrilla stronghold in Shansi where he remained until 1949. During this period, Hua served as a county level Party secretary and as political officer of the local troops (a component of the Second Field Army under the command of Deng Xiaoping). Hua journeyed to Hunan in the summer of 1949 shortly after its Communist takeover, where he became the leading Party secretary in Hsiang-yin county and political commissar of the County Armed Forces Department. For the next two years, Hua was involved in militia work, restoring agricultural production, and the implementation of the land reform directives.

In July, 1951, Hua was transferred to Hsiang-t'an as county Party secretary. Although technically not a promotion, this new assignment afforded Hua greater opportunities, because Hsiang-t'an county was larger, encompassed a large municipality for greater exposure and, most importantly, included Shao-shan, Mao's home town. During this one year assignment, Hua concentrated on organizing and implementing mutual aid teams (MATs) and monitoring the counties' efforts in the Anti-Locust Campaign.

In October, 1952, Hua was promoted to head of the Hsiang-t'an special district government office. With this promotion, Hua not only rose to the ranks of the upper cadres but shifted from party to government work. By March, 1955, Hua was the ranking secretary in the district which included twelve counties. Hua spearheaded the cooperativization drive in his district with a great amount of success. The rate of cooperativization in Hsiang-t'an district was twice that of the rest of Hunan which ranked 27th out of 28 provinces. (130:13) In essence, Hua became the one shining light in a province very sluggishly implementing Mao's cooperativization directive. Presumably because of this success, Hua soon assumed a leading role in Hunan's cooperativization drive and published three important articles which closely paralleled and provided major support for Mao's 31 July speech calling for an accelerated cooperativization pace. He gained national prominence in November, 1955 when the leading theoretical journal, Hsueh-hsi, carried a Hua article stressing the importance of accurate class analysis in implementing cooperativization. His article appeared in the same issue which carried Mao's 31 July speech.

In 1956 Hua became the head of the Provincial Government Culture and Education Office. Although again technically not a promotion, his new job encompassed a greater degree of responsibility and authority and came at a pivotal point in time. (130:16) During his one year tenure, Hua was instrumental in organizing and implementing, in Hunan, two major national campaigns: The Eliminate Illiteracy Campaign and the Spread the

Use of Kuo-yu (national dialect) Campaign. Additionally, Hua and his staff were tasked to "remedy deficiencies among elementary schools, to consolidate and improve the system of Chinese medicine in the province, to organize an exhibition of peasant art, to strengthen ideological work in middle schools, to supervise the assignment of middle school graduates to their new jobs or to universities, and to manage the Rectification Campaign in the middle and primary schools." (130:17)

In 1957, Hua won an important promotion, over several superiors, to head the CCP United Front Department in Hunan. This appointment also occurred at a crucial time following the Hundred Flowers Campaign and during its anti-rightist aftermath. Hua's department directed the Anti-Rightist and Rectification Campaigns among Hunan's ethnic minorities, organized religions, democratic parties allowed to coexist with the CCP and industrialists and merchants who had cooperated with the CCP. Oksenberg and Yeung summarized Hua's performance as follows: "Hua was tough but not excessive, responsive to Peking yet not disturbing of the balance that had emerged in Hunan. He gained in stature from the campaign, but not in an evidently assertive, headline seeking way." (130:22)

With his job completed and the Anti-Rightist Campaign subsiding, Hua left the United Front Department in 1958. It is not precisely clear what position Hua then assumed, however, it is clear that he suffered no loss of stature. Positions and assignments held sequentially and at times simultaneously included head of the Party Committee's Economic Small Group,

vice-chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee on Scientific Work, vice-chairman of the Committee for Support of the Construction of Keypoint Projects, chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Hunan Economic Construction Exhibition Hall, member of the Provincial Party Committee, director of the Anti-Schistosomiasis Campaign and provincial Vice Governor. Once again, Hua had gravitated toward the central issue of the moment: economics and implementation of the Great Leap Forward. Although "not overwhelmed by the euphoria of the moment" and mindful that moving too fast could be damaging, Hua assumed a major leadership role in resolving the logistics problem associated with the support of communalization. (130:24)

In August 1959, the Provincial First Secretary, Chou Hsiao-chou, was purged as an ally of P'eng Teh-huai and Hua hurdled several members of the Party Standing Committee to become a Provincial Party Secretary. Oksenberg and Yeung concluded that the most plausible explanation for this significant promotion is that Hua "while not necessarily deliberately seeking to undermine First Secretary Chou, nonetheless furnished Mao with some of the data he needed to refute the P'eng (Teh-huai) attack. Already impressed with Hua's 1955 performance (supporting Mao's 31 July speech) Mao recommended Hua as a man who could appropriately be promoted." (130:33) Following this promotion, Hua became a member of the presidium for the Provincial Conference of Advanced Collectives and Advanced Producers, a vice-chairman of the Preparatory Committee to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the founding of The Republic, and vice-chairman of the Pro-

visional CPPCC organization. He delivered the government work report at the Second Session of the Second Provincial Assembly, a task generally reserved for the governor.

During the Anti-Rightist Opportunist Campaign which followed in the aftermath of P'eng Teh-huai's dismissal, Hua's official responsibilities included directing that campaign in the finance and trade arenas. However, his informal preoccupation became correcting the increasingly severe urban supply crisis associated with the Great Leap Forward. This dichotomy of responsibilities put Hua in a particularly delicate position. On the one hand, he was responsible for purging P'eng Teh-huai sympathizers while on the other, he was expected to alleviate the "shortages" P'eng and his supporters alleged existed, but which were denied by the official party line. In carrying out the latter responsibility, Hua stressed self-reliance. Local units would have to get out of the situation through their own efforts; external assistance would only be secondary. Additionally, Hua headed an inspection team which fanned throughout Hunan evaluating the results of the "Economize and Increase Production" campaign and identifying model units who, through their own ingenuity, were able to attain the goals assigned.

Available issues of the New Hunan Daily (Oksenberg and Yeung's primary source used in charting Hua's early career) terminated in December, 1960 so the detail associated with Hua's movements and activities becomes more sporadic and enigmatic until the 1970's in Peking. From 1960-1964 Hua continued to trouble-shoot agricultural problems. This period included

numerous fact finding inspection tours in diverse, rural areas and a great deal of personal effort toward developing Mao-t'ien into Hunan's model agricultural unit. On April 2, 1963, Hua wrote an article describing Mao-t'ien's exploits including the monumental task of guaranteeing a water supply in rough drought-prone terrain. Later that year, Mao toured Hunan and greatly praised the example of Mao-t'ien. The available evidence suggests that, as in 1955 and 1959, Mao drew heavily upon Hunan (and Hua) to document his position concerning the need for ideological and organizational vigilance in the countryside. (130:45) Available evidence indicates that Hua did return to Changsha in late 1963 to undertake an active role in the Socialist Education Campaign and the Four Clean-ups.

As the Viet Nam War began to escalate in late 1964, China became concerned with improving the efficiency of the Peoples Liberation Army and generally preparing for possible involvement. Hunan was ideally located as a secondary staging area so the province became embroiled in the preparations. Hua was intimately involved in these activities and became the Hunan spokesman on the Viet Nam War in both public and private gatherings. (130:47) This exposure capped his emergence as a political generalist by giving him a discernible role in foreign policy and national security affairs. (130:48)

In 1965-1966, Hua continued along the same line, working in a wide range of activities including: water conservation, agriculture, education, military affairs, public health and women's work. By the advent of the Cultural Revolution, Hua

had completed his transformation from a competent bureaucrat to a provincial political figure. Ranking fourth in the Hunan political hierarchy at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, Hua ranked first at its conclusion.

Very little is known about Hua's precise activities during the Cultural Revolution. On August 10, 1967, Hua was designated along with Li Yuan, to establish the Hunan Preparatory Group of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. The function of this Committee was to "take over the Party, administrative and financial affairs in Hunan." (151:83) He is known to have weathered (possibly with Mao's personal assistance) a severe attack by the Red Guards in early 1968. When the Hunan Revolutionary Committee was established in April 1968, Hua became the Second Vice-Chairman, losing ground to his major rival, Li who became Chairman. In April 1969, Hua became deputy for Hunan to the Ninth CCP Congress and subsequently, was elected to the Central Committee. From this point on, authority in Hunan began to shift to Hua. (151:85)

Following Li Yuan's purging in April 1970, Hua emerged as the supreme figure in Hunan due to two successive contests with the leading military authorities in Hunan (both of whom were aligned with Lin Piao). In November 1970, Hua was elected First Secretary of the CCP Hunan Committee. From February 25 until September 4, 1971 Hua was not seen in public. He was summoned to Peking in November following the Lin Piao incident and given a major military position, Political Commissar of the Canton Military Region. The nature of Hua's precise duties in 1972 to

1973 while in Peking are not certain. It is speculated that Hua was involved in the investigation of the Lin Piao affair and was Director of the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee. (151:86)

In August 1973, Hua became a member of the Politburo at the Tenth CCP Congress. At the Fourth National Peoples Congress in January 1975 Hua was named a Vice Premier (ranking sixth) and Minister of Public Security. Although certainly still on the rise, Hua's leap from the number six Vice Premier to Acting Premier in January 1976, upon Zhou Enlai's death took everyone by surprise. He was subsequently appointed Premier and First Vice Chairman of the CCP. On October 6, 1976, one month after Mao's death, Hua helped engineer the arrest of the Gang of Four and was subsequently named Chairman of the CCP. He continues to maintain these top positions.

Several key features of Hua's personality and style can be gleaned from his career. First, and probably most important because of its direct impact upon this thesis, is his penchant for self-effacement. Throughout his career, Hua has preferred to be unobtrusive and has by and large avoided the limelight in contrast to many of his peers. (130:18) Oksenberg and Yeung observed that Hua prefers a "bureaucratic style" of communication; a style in which his remarks are limited to in house circulation. Although the press is encouraged to incorporate these views into editorials, Hua tends to avoid directly linking these with his name.

Hua's personal life remains almost a complete official blank. An article in Cheng Ming claimed that Hua is using an alias. His real name was reported to be Su Chu. He has a wife, Han Chih-chun who is never seen or officially referred to, as well as four children who use the surname Su. It has been theorized that Hua chose his "new" name by picking three characters from Chung Hua Kang Jih Chiu Kuo Hsien Feng Tui (the Chinese Vanguard Troop to Resist Japan and Save the Country). David Bonavia refers admiringly to Hua's ability to be self-effacing at "the right time" and likens him to Zhou Enlai in this regard. (105:160)

It is primarily because of this orphic personality that Hua has generally preferred not to be a public orator hence, the amount of data available for this thesis is considerably less than that which would be available for a more outspoken figure such as Deng Xiaoping. Additionally, his avoidance of the limelight throughout his career has literally shrouded him in mystery. His appointment as acting Premier in 1976 was termed a "revelation" by some analysts, (84:24) and Hua has been referred to as "China's Mysterious Leader" and "Peking Mystery Man." (85:24) On the other hand, his flair for self-effacement and in particular, his ability to avoid irreversible identification with any faction has rendered him ideally suited as an umpire for intra-Politburo disputes and a compromise candidate. Additionally, it may have restrained the creation of many personal enemies.

One of the apparent hallmarks of Hua's work style is his propensity for personal investigation. Oksenberg and Yeung theorize that the importance of this technique was engraved into Hua's mind as a result of an unfortunate incident in 1951 while serving as Hsiang-yin County Secretary. It appears that Hua routinely endorsed, without query, the death sentence of an innocent peasant, Yang Te-lun. When the incident came to light during the San-Fan Movement in July 1952, Hua was required to confess to a minor bureaucratic error for the excessive quickness with which the case was concluded and for blindly accepting the report from below without independent verification. Undoubtedly embarrassed by this unfortunate lesson, Hua's subsequent career is marked by an almost fanatical use of inspections and personal investigations into conditions under his purview.

The third aspect of Hua's career which stands out for its uniqueness is the great diversification of assignments and acquired expertise. Unlike the standard career path in China, Hua did not remain locked in one specialty but rather, acquired expertise in, among other areas, Agriculture, Trade, Finance, Education and Military Affairs. This diversity came as a direct result of Hua's demonstrated talent for problem solving. All key assignments were made at times of crisis in the respective area. For example, Hua was assigned to the United Front Department in 1957 to handle the sticky Anti-Rightist Campaign. His brief stint in the Culture and Education Department coincided with numerous problems in the hastily over expanded education system.

It would seem from looking at Table 1 that no matter what Hua's assignment, his activities and pursuits always tended to gravitate toward the central issue of the day. In fact, Oksenberg and Yeung commented that "through an indiscernible combination of interest, ability and invitation, he (Hua) consistently drifted to the center of the action." (130:52)

The following selection of analysts' adjective-like descriptions of Hua effectively summarize his basic qualities and capsulize his personality. They are included to acquaint the reader with Hua, the individual, and serve as a back drop for understanding his operational code.

"tough minded administrator" (130:22)

"solid and thorough" (130:18)

"very sober sense for gravitations of power" (107:489)

"smooth and devious" (102:8)

"pragmatic problem solver" (130:18)

"adept at coordinating subordinates" (130:19)

"first and foremost an opportunist" (107:488)

"competence and responsiveness without flamboyance" (130:28)

"considerably developed flexibility on principles" (107:489)

"cautious and noncontroversial" (152:40)

"mild and softspoken" (96:6)

"meticulous in organization and direction" (132:39)

"unobtrusive manner" (96:6)

"shrewd and forceful" - James R. Schlesinger (86:25)

"I would compare (his succession to Mao) to the replacement of President Roosevelt by President Truman in 1945" James R. Schlesinger (86:26)

TABLE 1

HUA CAREER SYNOPSIS

Year	Assignments	Areas of Involvement	Events in China
1920	Born in Shansi Province		
1947	Yang-Chu County Party Secretary Political Officer in Second Field Army		
1949	Hsiang-Yin County (Hunan) Party Secretary Political Commissar, County and Armed Forces Department	Militia Work Agriculture and Land Reform	Yang Te-lun Incident
1951	Hsiang-t'an County (Hunan) Party Secretary	Improvement of Cadres Organizing MATS	
1952	Head, Hsiang-t'an Special District Government Office* Director, Hunan Sino-Soviet Friendship Association Committee Member, First Hunan People's Consultative Conference	Cooperativization	San-Fan Movement
1955	Hsiang-t'an Special District Secretary	Cooperativization	July 31, 1955 Speech
1956	Head, Provincial Government Culture and Education Office (Changsha) Head, Preparatory Committee of the Provincial Eliminate Illiteracy Association	Eliminate Illiteracy Campaign Spread Kuo-yü Campaign	
1957	Head, CCP United Front Department(Hunan)*	Purge Extremists of Hundred Flowers	Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Movement

	Group Vice Chairman, Hunan Provincial Committee on Scientific Work Vice Chairman, Committee for Support of the Construction of Keypoint Projects Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Hunan Economic Construction Exhibition Hall Member, Provincial Party Committee Provincial Vice Governor (Hunan)* Head, Support Agricultural Production Small Group Vice Chairman, Increase Production and Economize Committee	and Health Specialist Anti-schistosomiasis Campaign Coal Production Sweet Potato Production Logistics for Communes	Campaign
1959	Hunan Party Secretary* Member, Presidium, Provincial Conference of Advanced Collectives and Advanced Producers Vice Chairman, 10th Anniversary Celebration Preparatory Committee Vice Chairman, Provincial CPPCC	Supervise Anti-Rightist Campaign in Finance Trade Systems Alleviate Economic Problems of Great Leap	P'eng Teh-huai Anti-Rightist Campaign
1965	Hunan Spokesman on Viet Nam War Commander and Commissar of Shao-Shan Irrigation Project	Military Preparedness Water Conservation	
1967	Founder, Hunan Preparatory Group of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee	Unknown	Cultural Revolution
1968	Vice Chairman, Provincial Revolutionary Committee	Unknown	Cultural Revolution
1969	Member, 9th Central Committee of CCP	Unknown	Cultural Revolution
1970	Hunan Party First Secretary* Chairman, Provincial Revolutionary Committee	Unknown	

1971	Member, Staff Office of the State Council (Peking)		Lin Piao
1972	Political Commissar Canton Military Region	Lin Piao Investigation	Lin Piao
1973	Member, Politburo (10th Party Congress) First Political Commissar Hunan Military Region	Agriculture Lin Piao Investigation	
1974		Brief Wall Poster Attack	Criticism of Lin and Confucious
1975	Vice Premier* Minister of Public Security*	Agriculture and Security	
1976	Acting Premier* First Vice Chairman of CCP* Premier* Chairman of CCP* Editor in Chief of the Fifth Volume Director of Construction of Mao Mausoleum Chairman CCP Military Affairs Committee Commander in Chief		Zhou Enlai Death Tien Anmen Riot Deng Disgraced Mao Death Gang of Four
1977 to now	No Changes in Positions Held		

*Major Positions and Promotions

III. METHODOLOGY

This chapter is designed to provide the reader with an understanding of belief systems analysis, its potential and its problems. It explores the development of the operational code construct and delineates the manner of its incorporation into this thesis.

A. BELIEF SYSTEMS

An individual's behavior is, to a large degree, determined by the way in which he perceives, diagnoses and evaluates his environment. It is generally agreed that in order to cope with the very complex reality of one's environment, individuals must by necessity, form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of that environment.

Because the foreign policy environment, in particular, is "characterized by structural uncertainty" (189:18) a decision maker is driven to interpret this confusion and uncertainty by filtering his perceptions through clusters of beliefs or "cognitive maps" of different parts of his social and physical environment. (175:3) In other words, an individual tends to assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones and strives to minimize subjective discrepancies between these perceptions and previous expectations. (186:20) Consequently, his "psychological environment" may vary widely from reality and subsequent actions may seem inconsistent with the demands of the real environment.

This central role of belief systems in decision making has long been recognized. (187:3) Yet, empirical research in this area has been slight and somewhat disjunctured. Extensive application of cognitive approaches has been inhibited by various methodological problems (such as, data access and laboriousness of coding) and three general criticisms concerning the relevancy of the approach in general. These criticisms are: skepticism about the relevance of the contribution of psychology to the analysis of political phenomena, the canon of parsimony, and problems of linking beliefs to foreign policy actions. (175:6)

The first criticism concerns the wisdom of borrowing theories and concepts from a discipline which itself lacks concensus concerning the role of belief systems.

The parsimony argument asserts that by the time one has considered the systemic, societal, governmental and bureaucratic aspects of political action most of the variance in foreign policy making has already been accounted for. Individual attributes of the decision maker are therefore of a residual nature. Consequently, extensive research on belief systems is not justifiable from an economic standpoint. One achieves greater insight for his labors by concentrating on other levels of analysis.

The third criticism evolves from a basic inability on the part of some researchers (and critics) to realize that direct linkages between beliefs and action do not exist. Rather than serving as direct guides to action, they are one of several intervening variables that affect decision behavior. (175:23)

Although there are several approaches to the study of belief systems and decision making, i.e., mind sets, cognitive maps, psycho-logic and operational codes, they all share several premises. The first is a disenchantment with the apparent inadequacy of the black-box approach to understanding decision output. Second, it is assumed that the belief systems themselves are systematically related to the way in which leaders perceive, diagnose, prescribe and choose, especially in situations of uncertainty. The third is the belief that the attributes of decision makers are not only important, but are a logical starting point for political analysis. This final premise, in effect a rebuttal of the parsimony criticism, is supported by numerous studies.

Robert J. Art, for example, concluded that the more important decisions in recent American foreign policy are better explained by the "mind-sets" of top leaders than by a bureaucratic politics perspective. (156:467) Glen H. Stassen's reevaluation of Rosenau's data on the behavior of United States Senators toward Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles revealed that "belief-sets" provided a more plausible explanation of their behavior than did role. (188:96)

In short, there is a growing body of empirical research supporting the notion that belief systems are central to and perhaps dominate, decision making. Matthew Bonham and Michael Shapiro sum up this position by stating that, "beliefs of foreign policy decision makers are central to the study of decision outputs and probably account for more of the variance than any other single factor." (159:161)

Acknowledging that cognitive studies are relevant and profitable, although still suffering from the fragmented and relatively non-cumulative nature of existing research, O. R. Holsti concluded that what was required was a framework and concepts which were "neither at such a low level of abstraction that they will be of value only in a single case (i.e., beliefs about the value of the Panama Canal) nor at such a high level as to have little recognizable relationship to politics." (175:34) The operational code construct has evolved over the last twenty-five years specifically to meet this requirement.

B. THE LEITES CONTRIBUTION

The operational code concept had its beginnings in Nathan Leites' book, The Operational Code of the Politburo published in 1951. This was followed by Leites' A Study of Bolshevism in 1953. The first work attempted to ascertain the Politburo's beliefs, tactics, strategies and values by means of qualitative content analysis of Politburo action accounts and the public statements of Lenin and Stalin. The later work went farther in attempting to develop the precepts or maxisms of political tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics. In each case, Leites promoted the operational code as "a set of general beliefs about fundamental historical issues and central questions as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action." (166:191)

Leites' work received mixed reviews as a tool for relevant political research and essentially lay in limbo until the mid

1960's when Alexander George of Stanford University further developed Leites' concepts. Most of the criticism and subsequent avoidance of Leites' approach centered around two areas. The first concerned Leites' incorporation of psychoanalytic theory which was deemed inappropriate for political research. The second is summed up by John Weakland, who noted that Leites' work is "remarkably simple in overall organization, and for a work aiming to present a code, it gives little attention to synthesis and systematization." (185:D11) Stated another way, Alexander George commented that, "he (Leites) did not clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy and interrelationships among the various elements of the 'code.'" (166:196)

C. THE GEORGE CONTRIBUTION

In 1969, Alexander George published an article entitled "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." (166:190) In this work, George summarizes Leites' effort and sets out to correct the two aforementioned criticisms. He carefully "factored out" (166:195) the operational code position of the study and structured it into a system of five philosophical and five instrumental belief questions which were felt to encompass the essence of one's political beliefs.

The philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises that the subject makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict and the role of the individual in history. The instrumental beliefs encompass

beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action. (166:199) George maintained that answers to these "questions" could be derived via qualitative or non-frequency content analysis. These beliefs also provide norms, standards and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative action." (166:191) George was quick to caveat the above statement by asserting that an operational code influences but "does not unilaterally determine" (166:191) decision making. In other words, it is an important, but not the only variable shaping decision making. George does maintain, however, that the code has an abnormally high level of importance in decision making in certain types of situations: 1) Non-routine situations like wars, alliances, etc., 2) Decisions made by top leaders affected less by organizational processes, 3) Long-range policy planning in which uncertainty of the future brings out differences among policy makers, 4) Ambiguous situations due to little information and open to a variety of interpretations, 5) Circumstances of information overload where a considerable amount of filtering is needed, 6) Unanticipated events where the initial reaction might depend on a belief system, 7) Situations of stress in which normal cognitive processes are impaired such as, frustration or aggression. (162:20)

Most of the operational code studies completed to date utilized the George construct. Subjects of these studies include: Willy Brandt, James F. Byrnes, Frank Church, Mark Hatfield, Ramsay MacDonald, Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles,

Kurt Schumacher, Pierre Trudeau, John Kennedy and others. Although following the same general framework, these analyses are uneven in quality. (175:41)

Holsti cites three problems with the George construct and the studies developed from it: (175:41)

1) The construct allows too much leeway in the interpretation of each of the ten questions. (i.e., some cases explore different dimensions of a given belief and are therefore difficult to compare).
2) There is no uniformity in the nature of evidence used as indicators for the beliefs.
3) The method is not conducive toward quantitative analysis. In other words, category definitions and the rules of inclusion are poorly specified.

D. THE HOLSTI CONTRIBUTION

Under grant to the National Science Foundation, O. R. Holsti expanded upon the George construct. (172+175) The original set of questions that constituted the George version were broken down into a more detailed and precise set of subsidiary questions and extensive rules for coding answers to them. For example, instead of merely asking the question "What is the nature of the political universe?" in which case the analyst is relatively free to explore and/or emphasize any one of many possible aspects, the analyst also asks "What is the nature of conflict?, What are the conditions of peace?, What is the scope of conflict?, What is the role of historical development? and What is the source of knowledge for this belief?. Within each

subcategory there are typologies of responses which allow the coder to determine approximately what type of answer he is looking for. For example, in asking, "What is the nature of conflict?, the coder is trying to determine if the actor considers the world to be: 1) conflictual, 2) harmonious, 3) mixed, 4) other. This format permits an analyst who is unfamiliar with content analysis procedures, to accomplish an operational code in depth by giving specific instructions and typologies of responses that give a frame of reference for possible answers. This format also facilitates quantitative analysis, provides uniformity and thereby helps control the potential skewness of data and allows for comparative analysis.

E. DATA

Every published statement (English Language) made by Hua Guofeng appearing in the following sources since 1967 was accumulated and coded for this thesis: Current Background, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (PRC), Peking Review, Selections from China Mainland Magazines and Survey of China Mainland Press. Every effort was made to locate and utilize all known Hua speeches and writings. Appendix A depicts the material by year in two ways. The first table shows the frequency of speeches/writings for each year while the second table tabulates the volume (in terms of single spaced pages) by year. As would be expected, both measures increase directly as a function of time.

Although the question of whether public statements truly reflect private beliefs cannot be definitely resolved, only

open sources were used in this analysis for two reasons. First, and most obvious, is the fact that these are the only sources available. Second, ongoing monitoring of public sources can easily be accomplished allowing for periodic updates of the code.

F. CODING

Coding was accomplished using the structure outlined in O. R. Holsti's The "Operational Code" As an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems. The Holsti structure, itself, has already been briefly described in an example of one belief category, its subsidiary questions and sample response typologies. The following is a list of the basic categories and subsidiary questions comprising the operational code methodology. Each subsidiary question has a set of response typologies which facilitate and standardize the coding. Each category, subcategory and response typology is explained in greater detail in the following chapter.

Philosophical Beliefs

1a. What is the "essential" nature of the political universe?

Is the political universe basically conflictural or harmonious?
What are the sources of conflict?
What are the conditions of peace?
What is the nature of conflict?
What is the scope of conflict?
What is the role of conflict?

1b. What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents and of other significant political actors?

What is the nature of the opponent's goals?
What are the sources of the opponent's goals?

Is the adversary's opposition permanent and general or limited and specific?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our conciliatory actions?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our policies of firmness?
What is the opponent's image of one's own nation?
What is the opponent's view of conflict?
What is the nature of the opponent's decision-making process?
What is the opponent's "operational code?"

1c. What is the nature of the contemporary international system?

Is the international system basically conflictual or harmonious?
What are the sources of conflict?
What are the conditions of peace?
What is the structure of the contemporary international system?
How stable is the contemporary international system?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score: and in what respects the one and/or the other?

What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
Should one be optimistic or pessimistic? About long term goals? About specific undertakings?
Is the optimism or pessimism conditional?
On whose side is time?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? What is the role of chance in human affects and history?

Is political life capricious, or does it conform to a more or less discernible pattern?
What aspects of political life are predictable or unpredictable?
What degree of predictability exists in political life?

4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

What is the role of the leader?

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives of political action?

   How should one establish the goals for political action?
   Should one seek optimal goals or is it better to seek satisfactory ones?
   How many paths are there to the achievement of ultimate goals?
   How should one deal with value conflicts?

2. How are the goals of political action pursued most effectively?

   Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal?
   What approaches should be used in the pursuit of goals?
   Under what circumstances should one push harder, be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a previously held position?
   Under what circumstances is unilateral action preferred?
   Multilateral action?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

   How are risks assessed?
   What approach should be used to limit or control risk?
   How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs associated with risk?
   Under what circumstances are high risk (or low risk) policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

   How important is timing in the achievement of major, long-term aspirations?
   How important is timing in the success of specific policy undertakings?
   When is action required, permitted or prohibited?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? What resources can one draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?

   What are the preferred tactics?
   How is power conceptualized?

This thesis proceeded along a quantitative path. The frequency with which specific responses were given to each of the operational code questions served as the measure of importance. An acknowledged pitfall of using frequency as a unit of enumeration is the inherent failure to consider intensity, i.e., is the data from a routine banquet speech for a Third World dignitary or is it from a major policy address? In retrospect, this limitation posed no significant problem. By and large, all statements were consciously chosen for publication and contained similar tones of intensity. Anomalies created by intensity variations are addressed in a separate chapter. The coding instructions were followed meticulously document by document in order to minimize the researcher's subjective predispositions and facilitate academic replication.

G. RELIABILITY

Reliability requires that "repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results." (170:151) Reliability in this thesis was measured by submitting a questionnaire containing five passages selected from the material to ten coders. Four coders were National Security Affairs students with some exposure to the operational code concept and knowledge of the Peoples Republic of China. Three coders were Naval Postgraduate students in other curricula. The other three coders were not affiliated at all with the school. All coders had at least a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree. The reliability questionnaire and specific results are described in Appendix B.

IV. OPERATIONAL CODE

This section provides the frequency distribution of coded responses from Hua Guofeng speeches for each of the categories in the operational code construct. An introduction is provided for each category including a short synopsis of the question involved and a description of each Holsti response typology.

All coded data was aggregated on a computer. Consequently, all tables appearing in this section are computer generated. Code 0 in all cases represents a "no response" typology and is therefore excluded (missing) in the computation of adjusted and cumulative frequencies. As an example, in Table 2 86.9% of all Hua's references to the nature of political life described it as conflictual.

A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

1.(a) What is the Essential Nature of the Political Universe?

Answers to this question are the bases for constructing an actor's core beliefs concerning the characteristics of politics, history, social life, the universe and human interactions.

a. What is the Nature of Political Life?

An actor may believe that conflict is the normal state of affairs, or conversely, that there is a basic harmony among nations or a mixture of both. Typologies include:
(1) Conflictual (2) Harmonious (3) Mixed.

TABLE 2

NATURE OF POLITICAL LIFE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CONFLICTUAL	1.	53	86.9	86.9
MIXED	2.	6	9.8	96.7
	0.	46	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Chairman Hua clearly ascribes to the view of a conflictual political universe. He continually refers to the world as "... in an epoch of great upheaval" with "all the basic contradictions sharpening." (43:7) This conflictual perception of human interaction prevails both on the international level with nations as the primary actors and on the domestic level with classes as the primary actors. At the All-Army Political Work Conference in May, 1978 he stated, "In our struggle to carry out the general task for the new period, we face an external threat from social-imperialism (USSR) and imperialism (US) as well as complicated class struggle internally." (14:13)

This conflictual environment, according to Hua, is not likely to dissipate soon. "... class struggle and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads all exist and ... this struggle is protracted and complicated." (58:14) As evidence of this belief Hua points to history stating that, "The road of advance of human history is always tortuous." (1:5)

b. What is the Nature of Conflict?

This category is designed to determine whether an actor views conflict with or without a zero-sum orientation. A zero-sum orientation entails a belief that the gain of one participant is necessarily the loss of the other. A nonzero-sum orientation views both parties as capable of gaining or losing in a given situation. Alternatively, an actor may view both zero-sum and nonzero-sum attributes of conflict as relevant depending upon the situation. Typologies include: 1) Zero-sum 2) Nonzero-sum 3) Mixed.

TABLE 3

NATURE OF CONFLICT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ZERO SUM	1.	4	100.0	100.0
	0.	103	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Although rarely addressed, it is not surprising that Chairman Hua, being a Communist leader, would overwhelmingly view conflict as a zero-sum interaction. Marxist ideology stresses the all or nothing consequences of the communist-capitalist confrontation. "It is a life and death struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and on its outcome hinges the future and destiny of ... our country." (49:25) This zero-sum orientation dictates only one feasible solution to China's internal struggle, "towards the national bourgeoisie, our policy

is to eliminate it as a class." (58:35)

c. What is the Scope of Conflict?

At issue here is the extent to which issues are linked. An actor may view all issues as being linked to one fundamental conflict. They may be viewed as independent and separate. An actor may view the issues as separate, but closely related with a high potential for conflict spillover from issue to issue. Typologies include: 1) All issues are linked 2) High spillover 3) Issues separable.

TABLE 4

SCOPE OF CONFLICT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ALL ISSUES LINKED	1.	2	50.0	50.0
ISSUES SEPARABLE	3.	2	50.00	100.0
	0.	103	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Data in this category has proven contradictory and inconclusive. Chairman Hua has on occasion implied that political conflicts, irregardless of their particular structures, are but an expression of an overriding all-encompassing class struggle. For example, "... the concrete class struggle and two-line struggle on all fronts (of endeavor)." (34:A12)

At other times, he divorces existing issues of contention and agreement from ideological linkages. "True, China and the United States have different social systems and ideologies

and there are differences of principle on quite a number of issues; however, our two countries have many points in common in the world today." (1:5)

d. What is the Role of Conflict in Historical Development?

In this category the subject's views concerning the utility of conflict are examined. He may believe that conflict is necessary for the achievement of goals and is therefore valuable in and of itself. Conflict may be considered costly, but nonetheless helpful in achieving goals (functional). Alternatively, conflict may be viewed as an obstacle to the achievement of goals and therefore dysfunctional. Typologies include: 1) Necessary 2) Functional 3) Dysfunctional.

TABLE 5

ROLE OF CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
NECESSARY	1.	12	100.0	100.0
	0.	95	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Chairman Hua firmly believes that conflict is a necessary prerequisite for the realization of China's primary goals. In the concluding remarks of his Report on the Work of the Government, delivered at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua cautions the audience that they must "work hard to reach our great goal (modernization) through indomitable struggle." (58:40)

Regarding the international scene, Hua stresses that, "Resolute struggle should be waged against the schemes of social-imperialism and expansionists for aggression and subversion." (68:J8) He extends his belief in the necessity of conflict to numerous political situations throughout the world. In referring to Africa for example, Hua states that the South African SOWETO "massacre" "... stresses the need for continuing the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, white racism, Zionism and big-power hegemonism." (43:7) In his references to domestic struggle, Chairman Hua continually emphasizes that "it is imperative for the proletariat to persist in its struggle ..." (49:31)

1.(b) What is the Fundamental Character of one's Political Opponents and of other Significant Political Actors?

a. What are the Adversary's Basic Goals and Aspirations?

If the opponent is believed to harbor unlimited aspirations such as hegemony, the destruction or radical transformation of the International System, conquest and enslavement, et cetera, he is considered destructionist. An aggressive, opportunistic opponent whose goals fall short of destruction is considered expansionist. A defensive opponent is one concerned with its own security and maintenance of the status quo. An adversary may be viewed as conciliatory if a willingness to undertake at least limited accommodation is communicated. An active seeker of peace is prepared to undertake major peace initiatives and concessions. Typologies include: 1) Destructionist 2) Expansionist 3) Defensive 4) Conciliatory

5) Active seeker of peace.

TABLE 6

ALL OPPONENTS GOALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
DESTRUCTIONIST	1.	27	55.1	55.1
EXPANSIONIST	2.	21	42.9	98.0
DEFENSIVE	3.	1	2.0	100.0
	0.	58	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Premier Hua is very clear and adamant about the basis of his opponents' goals. As can readily be seen, Hua overwhelmingly categorizes his opponents as either destructionist or expansionist with a fairly even split. The split predominantly corresponds to his referencing the Soviet Union as destructionist and the United States as expansionist. It must be noted, however, that a downward trend in the category continuum in the case of the United States has occurred over time. Appendix C presents a year by year comparison of responses referencing the United States and the Soviet Union. The following quotes are a random sampling of Hua's pointed beliefs concerning United States and USSR goals:

> "In particular, the superpower that is most vociferous for "detente," (USSR) in its quest for world hegemony, is deliberately squeezing into every opening and making trouble and carrying out expansion everywhere." (46:4)

> "Internationally ... the Soviet Union and the United States are locked in a fierce struggle for world domination." (58:14)

"The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country." (49:53)

"While one superpower has been forced to contract, the other superpower (USSR) has grabbed the chance to step up its infiltration and expansion in the Asian Pacific region in an attempt to bring it into its sphere of influence." (48:11)

"That imperialism which flaunts the signboard of socialism has reached out its grasping hands everywhere and carried out rabid expansion." (1:5)

b. What are the Sources of the Opponent's Goals?

This category can be subdivided into two theoretical views. The first is the belief that an adversary's behavior is generated by its own characteristics such as ideology, historical goals, internal needs and leadership traits. The other view assumes that external forces such as, traditional power politics, or external pressure are the driving sources. Typologies include: 1) Ideology 2) History 3) Internal Needs 4) Leader 5) Power Politics 6) External.

TABLE 7

SOURCE OF ALL OPPONENTS POLICY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
IDEOLOGY	1.	5	27.8	27.8
HISTORY	2.	7	38.9	66.7
LEADER	3.	2	11.1	77.8
POWER POLITICS	4.	4	22.2	100.0
	0.	89	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Chairman Hua perceives several sources simultaneously driving the selection and pursuit of opponents' goals. He refers to history as a precedent for present goals. "Today's big-power hegemonism have always wanted to invade and control this country of strategic importance and long history (Egypt)." (45:8) Ideology also contributes rather heavily to the Superpower's aggressive goals. "Imperialism (and social imperialism) means aggression." (49:40) Leadership is addressed as a source only in the case of the Soviet Union whose "revisionist clique ... (is) perpetrating aggression and expansion abroad." (49:42)

Classic power politics is cited repeatedly as a source of world problems. The United States and Soviet Union are locked in "contention for world domination and frantically push their policies of aggression and war." (58:36)

c. What is the Generality of the Adversaries' Hostility or Opposition?

This category centers around the actor's perception of the opponents' hostility as being either broad basic differences upon which single policy initiatives would have no appreciable effect or, based on issues of a specific nature. The latter view implies that the hostility is limited to the period of time required to resolve the issue. Typologies include: 1) General/Permanent 2) Specific/Limited.

TABLE 8

GENERALITY OF ALL ADVERSARIES OPPOSITION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
GEN-PERM	1.	16	84.2	84.2
SPEC-LIM	2.	3	15.8	100.0
	0.	88	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Chairman Hua tends to view conflict with all opponents as permanent and of an all-encompassing and ideologically based nature. "So long as social imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable." (58:36) Another indication of this permanency is evidenced by Hua's belief that "the superpowers will never be reconciled to their defeat." (45:8) Not only does Hua perceive the hostility to be of a permanent nature, he views the situation to be uncontrollable. The fact that, in his opinion, the superpowers want war, "... is determined by their imperialist nature and is therefore independent of man's will. Imperialism means aggression, aggression means war." (49:40)

d. What is the Likely Response to the Adversary to Our Conciliatory Moves?

The opponent may respond to a conciliatory initiative by reciprocating within the confines of the particular issue or may reciprocate in other areas. The opponent may simply ignore the initiative. Interpreting the initiative as a sign of weakness, the opponent may take the opportunity to register

a quick gain in the field of that specific issue or in another area. Typologies include: 1) Reciprocate in this situation 2) Reciprocate in other situations 3) Ignore 4) Take advantage in this situation 5) Take advantage in other situations.

TABLE 9

LIKELY RESPONSE OF ADVERSARY TO ONES OWN CONCILIATORY ACTIONS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
IGNORE	3.	1	50.0	50.0
ADVANTAGE OTHER	5.	1	50.0	100.0
	0.	105	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Premier Hua feels that any attempt at conciliation will be either ignored or taken advantage of. In his most pointed address on this subject, Hua cites historical precedent as a clear demonstration of the folly of appeasement. "There is a trend towards appeasement among those people in the West who cherish the illusion that peace can be maintained through compromises and concessions and some even want to follow in Chamberlain's footsteps and try to divert the peril of the new Tzars towards the East. In so doing they will merely abet the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet revisionists and hasten the outbreak of war." (49:40)

e. What is the Likely Response of the Adversary to Our Policy of Firmness?

An actor can anticipate an opponent taking one of five possible responses. He may back down. Working under his own firm timetable, he may just ignore the new stance. An opponent may reciprocate with a firmer stance with respect to that particular issue or on some other issue. Being forced into a corner by the new policy of firmness, he may respond impulsively. Typologies include: 1) Back down 2) Ignore 3) Reciprocate in this situation 4) Reciprocate in other situations 5) Respond impulsively.

TABLE 10

RESPONSE TO POLICIES OF FIRMNESS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
BACK DOWN	1.	2	40	40
RESPOND IMPULSIVELY	5.	3	60	100
	0.	187	MISSING	100
TOTAL		192	100	

Chairman Hua maintains that a policy of firmness would be handled inadequately by an opponent. In Africa, for example, Hua perceives a policy of firmness and show of force by national liberation forces as evoking careless, impulsive action on the part of South Africa and Rhodesia: "They (Vorster and Smith) are putting up a desperate struggle." (44:5) Hua is fairly adamant in his belief that his opponents, especially the super-powers, would be forced to back down if confronted. He con-

tinually characterizes the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular, as being "paper tigers." "Wildly ambitious but inwardly weak, it (USSR) does not have enough strength to match its desires. It bullys the soft and fears the tough." (48:11) He believes that, "any country, be it big or small can withstand foreign threats ... if it defies tyranny and dares to wage struggle." (48:11)

f. What is the Opponent's View of Conflict?

This category has two dimensions. The first concerns the inevitability of conflict and the second concerns its desirability. Typologies include: 1a) Inevitable 1b) Avoidable 2a) Desirable 2b) Undesirable.

TABLE 11

OPPONENTS VIEW OF CONFLICT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
INEVITABLE	1.	4	57.1	57.1
DESIRABLE	3.	3	42.9	100.0
	0.	100	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

As the above table illustrates, Chairman Hua perceives that his opponents believe conflict is not only inevitable, but desirable. Hua believes that war is inevitable because of the existence of imperialism and social-imperialism, yet he perceives both the United States and the Soviet Union as purposefully planning upon war.

"They (US and USSR) work overtime to preach 'detente' and 'disarmament' with no other purpose than to fool people and hide their arms expansion and war preparations." (58:36) More directly, he says, "It is not the people of different countries or the people of China but the superpowers that want war." (49:40)

Hua goes on to say that not only is war inevitable, but at least in the case of the Soviet Union, conflict is a desirable route to the attainment of goals: "The Soviet Union relies mainly on its military power to carry out expansion." (58:36)

g. What are the Opponent's Decision-Making Processes?

There are two dimensions to this category. The first concerns the actor's perception of which of Alison's three models best portrays the adversary's decision-making process. (155) The second deals with whether the opponent behaves in a calculating manner or acts impulsively. Typologies include: 1) Model I (unitary rational actor) 2) Model II (organizational processes) 3) Model III (bureaucratic politics) 1a) Calculating 2a) Impulsive.

TABLE 12

OPPONENTS DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
MODEL 3	3.	8	100.0	100.0
	0.	99	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.00	

Premier Hua rarely discusses the internal decision-making processes of his antagonists except in the case of the Soviet Union. All references in this category are pointed at "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique," (49:42) who happen to be controlling the Soviet Union at the present time. It is this leading clique which has "brought about the degeneration of the Soviet Union" (49:41) and "stubbornly clings to a policy of hostility towards China." (58:39) Hua uses the term clique freely as synonomous with faction (for example, the Chiang Kai-shek clique, Pak Chong-hui clique, et cetera) which by definition, implies the existence of alternative factions.

h. What is the Opponent's Approach to the Choice of Objectives?

There are four dimensions to this category. The first dimension distinguishes between the perception of an adversary as an optimizer (maximize goals) or a sufficer. The second is concerned with the realistic nature or attainability of an opponent's goals. The third dimension examines the opponent's flexibility with regard to goal setting while the fourth dimension deals with its predictability. Typologies include: 1) Optimize 2) Suffice 1a) Realistic 2a) Unrealistic 1b) Flexible 2b) Inflexible 1c) Predictable 2c) Unpredictable.

TABLE 13

OPPONENTS OF CODE CHOICE OF OBJECTIVES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OPTIMIZE	1.	5	31.3	31.3
UNREALISTIC	4.	4	25.0	56.3
FLEXIBLE	5.	1	6.3	62.5
UNFLEXIBLE	6.	5	31.3	93.8
PREDICTABLE	7.	1	6.3	100.0
	0.	91	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Chairman Hua clearly perceives the superpowers as using an optimizing strategy and repeatedly refers to their desire to "dominate the world." (49:40) He believes that their goals are unrealistic because they lack the resolve and power to reach them. "Though wildly ambitious, it (USSR) is essentially flabby. Like all imperialists, it is but a paper tiger, outwardly strong but inwardly weak, and fierce of visage but faint of heart." (46:4) He characterizes some Soviet goals as "pure daydreaming" (49:47) and "nothing but a pipe dream." (58:39) On the topic of flexibility Hua contradicts himself. On the one hand he cites the flexibility of the Soviet Union's chameleon-like tendency to try many tactics to achieve a goal, "Although a certain superpower flaunts all kinds of banners and shifts various tactics ..." (32:A6) Hua states, however, that when faced with setbacks in a given arena, the superpowers

just continue along the same path: "... unreconciled to their reverses, the two hegemonist powers are intensifying their contention for world domination and frantically pushing their policies of aggression and war." (58:36)

i. How Does an Opponent Pursue Objectives?

An opponent may pursue objectives by making careful preparations (prepare ground) or he may take action as a way of testing its feasibility (try and see). An opponent may utilize a bit by bit approach, settling for small gains along the way (incremental) or he may believe in full scale all-out pursuit (blitzkrieg). Typologies include: 1) Prepare ground 2) Try and see 3) Incremental 4) Blitzkrieg.

The results in this category fail to demonstrate any consistent trends. Hua fails to clearly address this issue, but he implies a Blitzkrieg strategy: "The Soviet revisionists are working overtime to push their global 'offensive strategy'." (49:40) He refers on several occasions to "possible surprise attack from the enemy." (14:10) In other passages Hua uses the term muddling which, according to Charles E. Lindbloom, (181) is synonomous with incrementalism. "The superpowers are finding it more and more difficult to muddle along." (47:7)

1.c) <u>What is the Nature of the Contemporary International System</u>?

Answers to this question serve as the basis for ascertaining an actor's core beliefs concerning the make-up and functional utility of the current international situation.

a. What is the Nature of the Contemporary International System?

The international system may be viewed as follows: dominated by conflictual relations among nations, one in which mutual interests prevail and therefore predominantly harmonious, or some mixture of both due to geographic or economic variations. Typologies include: 1) Conflictual 2) Mixed 3) Harmonious.

TABLE 14

NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CONFLICTUAL	1.	64	91.4	91.4
MIXED	2.	6	8.6	100.0
	0.	37	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

It is not at all surprising that Chairman Hua would view the present international situation within the framework of his perceptions of the general political universe. He clearly believes that conflict not only thrives on today's international scene but is its foremost characteristic.

Hua repeatedly refers to the world today as one which is "far from tranquil" (8:9) and "characterized by great disorder under heaven." (48:11) The root of this conflict is also not surprising. "The superpowers are contending fiercely for world hegemony. They are the main cause of intranquility in the world." (35:A12) Hua believes that not only does conflict exist, it is intensifying.

"But we cannot fail to see that imperialism and hegemonism, locked in their rivalry for world hegemony, are engaged in fervid arms expansion and war preparations and are carrying out aggression and expansion everywhere, posing a grave threat to peace and to the security of all countries ... The series of incidents which have occurred in the Near and Middle East and in Africa and Asia clearly demonstrate that their contention is daily intensifying and that the factors for war are visibly growing." (5:14)

b. What are the Basic Sources of Conflict?

This question incorporates the three level distinction developed by Waltz (1959) in his analysis of explanations for war. (192)

First, the major source of conflict may be found in some basic element of human nature and may therefore be relatively permanent. Second, it may be rooted in differences of principle or ideology. Third, it may arise from specific issues. Typologies include: 1) Human nature 2a) National Attributes; Ideology 2b) National Attributes; Political 2c) National Attributes; Economic 3a) International System; Ideology 3b) International System; Nationalism 3c) International System; Economic 3d) International System; Power Politics.

Hua perceives two causal dimensions at the root of international conflict: nationalism and standard power politics. Both dimensions are related because of the role played in each by the superpowers. In essence, the first dimension views today's conflict from the perspective of superpower imperialism over the Third World, while the latter dimension views conflict as a head to head rivalry between the superpowers.

TABLE 15

SOURCES OF CONFLICT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
NATL ATTR ECONOMICS	3.	1	1.4	1.4
INTL SYS IDEOLOGY	4.	6	8.3	9.7
INTL SYS NATIONALISM	5.	27	37.5	47.2
INTL SYS ECONOMICS	6.	4	5.6	52.8
INTL SYS POWER POLIT	7.	32	44.4	97.2
	8.	2	2.8	100.0
	0.	35	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Hua sees the struggle of the Third World against imperialism as "a glorious tradition" (34:A11) and a united effort. Not only is nationalism and anti-imperialism an honored and necessary effort, it is an irresistible development. "Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution -- this trend of history is surging forward irresistibly." (35:A12)

According to Hua, the primary source of world conflict is superpower rivalry: " ... rivalry between ... the Soviet Union and the United States and their contradictions with the people of all lands have become particularly acute, constituting the central problem in international relations today." (58:35) This contention "extends all over the globe" (46:4) and therefore affects all countries either directly, as in Africa where it "constitutes the main danger to the independence and security

of the African countries," (44:5) or indirectly, with the growing threat of war: " ... the continuation of this rivalry is bound to lead to a new world war." (48:11)

c. What are the Conditions of Peace?

Responses to this self-evident question can cover a wide range. O. R. Holsti, in devising the code, predicted that most responses would focus on three categories: the individual (better education or communication among participants to suppress misunderstanding), the nation (eliminate or transform a specific nation or change in some other way the attributes of a nation) and the international system (eliminate inequalities such as, resources, standards of living, maintain a balance of power or transform basic features of the international system). (175:59) Consequently, typologies include: 1) Education/Communication 2) Eliminate Offending Nation(s) 3) Eliminate Inequalities 4) Balance of Power 5) Transform International System 6) Eliminate Capitalism.

TABLE 16

CONDITIONS OF PEACE

CATEGORY LAVEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EDUC-COM	1.	4	9.1	9.1
ELIM OFFEND NATION	2.	1	2.3	11.4
ELIM INEQUALITY	3.	11	25.0	36.4
BALANCE OF POWER	4.	28	63.6	100.0
	0.	63	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Hua refers only to conditions of temporary peace. Permanent peace is presumed to necessitate the demise of capitalism, but this is never specifically stated. Only one reference lends support to this assumption and that is, "So long as social imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable." (58:36)

Speaking of temporary peace, then, Hua cites three general contributing approaches toward its attainment. Each approach seems to be applicable toward peace on a different level along the friendly to hostile relations ladder. The first is communication. Hua believes that among friends, conflicts can be resolved through open communication stating that, " ... should differences arise, they (socialist countries) should seek a solution through friendly consultation." (58:37) Other aspects of communication include state visits and various exchange programs. "This visit by his excellency the prime minister (Lee Kuan Yew) is of benefit to promoting the friendship between the peoples of China and Singapore and the mutual understanding between our two countries." (78:A7)

Up a notch on the ladder of conflict, Hua implies that one can only hope to establish and maintain peace through mutual adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

> "It has been our consistent desire to develop friendly relations and co-operation with all countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We have always held that there must be equality among all countries regardless of size." (6:9)

It must be noted that references to the Five Principles were only made in conjunction with the following countries: Australia, New Zealand, North Korea, Laos, Nepal, Western Samoa, Pakistan, Romania and South Asian countries in general.

It is presumed, therefore, that temporary peace among unfriendly or hostile countries (for example, with superpowers and others who fail to heed the five principles) requires the third approach: balance of power. By balance of power, Hua envisions a united Third World (including China) which will effectively oppose superpower hegemonism. Hua repeatedly addresses the importance of unity which is the key to the balance.

> "In face of the stark reality of the growing danger of war, the people of the whole world (Third World) must heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and resolutely oppose superpower hegemonism." (48:11)

Hua also makes reference to the desirability of a united Europe in his balance of power scheme. "We also hope to see a united and powerful Europe." (58:38)

d. What is the Structure of the International System?

This category is concerned with the actor's perception of the international system as being basically polarized in nature, with two centers of decision, or pluralistic. Typologies include: 1) Polarized 2) Pluralistic.

TABLE 17

STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
POLARIZED	1.	1	4.2	4.2
PLURALISTIC	2.	23	95.8	100.0
	0.	83	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Although Hua views superpower contention as the greatest source of turmoil in today's international environment, he no longer perceives the environment to be polarized along the standard lines of capitalist-socialist, US-USSR, East-West.

Hua is a great advocate of the nonaligned and Third World movements. He cites the growth in the number of nonaligned countries as proof of a collapsing polarism and emerging pluralism.

> "Today the non-aligned movement has become a very important force in the struggle of the world's people against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. This is exactly why some people regard the non-aligned movement as a grave obstacle to their pursuance of the policy of aggression and expansion. They are doing their utmost to undermine the unity of the non-aligned movement, change its orientation and subordinate it to their hegemonist aims." (5:14)

Hua's numerous references to the need for, and power of a united Third World, and comments concerning a united Europe were addressed in the previous category. Let it suffice to say here that his strong advocacy of united fronts also reinforces his belief in a pluralistic international structure.

It is interesting to note, however, that Hua often lumps the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialists, superpowers, hegemonists and the "common enemy." (61:3) He does this so routinely that a case can be made in saying that Hua really has merely rearranged the polar structure from the classic East-West orientation to the have-have nots or hegemonists-third world polarization. If given the complete Third World unity for which he preaches, and increased United States-Soviet Union cooperation, such a polarization might ensue, but it has not yet and probably will not.

e. How Stable is the International System?

This category examines the relationships of issues within the international system. Does the actor view the current issues as all a part of some larger fundamental conflict or are they separate? If separate, are they so closely related that a high potential for "spillover" exists? Typologies include: 1) All Issues are Linked 2) High Spillover 3) Issues Separate.

TABLE 18

STABILITY OF SYSTEM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ALL ISSUES LINKED	1.	8	72.7	72.7
	2.	3	27.3	100.0
	0.	96	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

In the context of international relations, Chairman Hua tends to view all current conflicts as small manifestations of a larger, historical conflict: imperialism versus the underdeveloped. He refers to isolated geographical struggles as part of the struggle waged by ALL countries against imperialism. "Their (Third World countries) just struggles, in coordination with those of the people of other countries, are pounding away at the old order." (35:A12)

2. What are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?

Answers to this question provide the basis for ascertaining the role which optimism plays in the actor's core belief system.

a. What is the Nature of One's Fundamental Goals?

This category is limited to assertions about major long range goals and closely parallels the typology used for beliefs about the adversary's goals. (Philosophical Belief P-1(b) category.) Typologies include: 1) Destructionist 2) Expansionist 3) Defensive 4) Conciliatory 5) Active Seeker of Peace.

It is not at all surprising that Hua would view China as having defensive long range goals, given China's history over the last two centuries and Hua's perception of the Soviet Union as destructionist. For the last two hundred years China has had little positive control over her own resources in her relations with the "imperialist" West. Present Soviet goals are viewed as a continuation of this past: "The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country." (49:43)

TABLE 19

NATURE OF ONE'S OWN FUNDAMENTAL GOALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
DEFENSIVE	3.	42	76.4	76.4
CONCILIATORY	4.	5	9.1	85.5
MODERNIZE-SOCIALISM	6.	8	14.5	100.0
	0.	52	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Consequently, Hua is very consistent in his references to China's defensive orientation. It is important to note that there is an important distinction between defensive and conciliatory. As pointed out in a previous category, Hua is adamantly against any form of appeasement. In a defensive orientation, the search for security may lead to the infringement of the security (or even the sovereignty) of others, for example, Taiwan.

The first aspect of Hua's defensive goals concerns preventing Soviet (and United States) expansion, specifically at China's expense, but also on a global scale. "We are determined to combat superpower hegemonism and upset hegemonist world strategic plans so as to put off the outbreak of a world war and defend world peace." (30:E8) To reaffirm China's defensive posture, Hua states that China is "firmly opposed to big nations bullying small ones and strong nations bullying weak ones." (47:7) Equating the term superpower with, among other

things, hegemonist drives, he repeatedly declares that, "She (China) will not be a superpower, neither now nor ever in the future." (35:A12)

The second aspect of Hua's defensive position concerns China's second avowed goal to "turn China into a great, powerful and modern socialist country by the end of the century." (8:9) In order to accomplish this goal, Hua believes that China needs "a prolonged peaceful international environment to build our country and improve the living standards of our people." (6:9) This reinforces the urgency and preeminence of "opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers ..." (18:27) for, as asserted in category 1.(b) c., Hua believes that there can be no peace while the superpowers are free to pursue their expansionist policies.

b. Should One be Optimistic or Pessimistic Regarding the Pursuit of Goals?

Typologies include: 1) Optimistic, Unqualified 2) Optimistic, Qualified (conditioned on certain actions or conditions) 3) Mixed 4) Pessimistic.

TABLE 20

SHOULD ONE BE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OPTIMISM UNQUALIFIED	1.	19	59.4	59.4
OPTIMISM QUALIFIED	2.	13	40.6	100.0
	0.	75	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Any good leader should probably voice publically, at least, great optimism and Chairman Hua does this. His optimism is consistently based upon a few set factors: 1) the correctness of the Maoist line 2) the superiority of socialism 3) the resourcefulness of the Chinese people 4) historical precedent. The distinction between optimism unqualified and optimism qualified does not appear to be significant because most references to qualifying circumstances are very general in nature: for example, providing China learns "from foreign countries all their advanced experience" (4:15) or providing China carries out "the political line, policies, principles and methods of work formulated by Chairman Mao." (39:18) The following quotes capture the tone and assuredness of Hua's optimism:

> "Of course there will be difficulties ahead and arduous efforts are needed to surmount them. But there is no reason at all to be apathetic -- to underestimate the favorable conditions, be pessimistic and think that this or that is impossible." (58:19)

> "No difficulties whatsoever can stop the Chinese people from marching forward towards our set goal." (12:16)

> "Our goal can unquestionably be attained." (8:9)

> "Historical experience shows that anyone who attempts to play the hegemonic overlord in the world will be 'lifting a rock only to drop it on his own feet' and will eventually end up in failure." (79:5)

> "No matter how desperately they (superpowers) may struggle, they will not escape their ultimate doom." (47:7)

Hua explains his own optimism by saying, "We are revolutionary optimists and have full confidence in the future of the world." (54:10)

c. To what does the optimism/pessimism refer:

Typologies include: 1) Long term goals 2) Policy undertaking.

TABLE 21

OPTIMISM OR PESSIMISM IN REF TO

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
LONGTERM GOALS	1.	30	93.8	93.8
POLICY UNDERTAKING	2.	2	6.3	100.0
	0.	75	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

The fact that over 90% of Hua's optimistic assertions are in reference to long term goals is misleading given that Hua rarely addresses specific policy undertakings. The vast majority of optimistic assertions deal with containment and/or demise of the hegemonists and the Four Modernizations.

" ... superpower (USSR), whose trouble-making is doomed to failure." (46:4)

"Socialist China will surely flourish and become powerful, the goal of the four modernizations will certainly be attained." (11:5)

d. On whose side is time?

Typologies include: 1) Own 2) Opponent's.

TABLE 22

ON WHOSE SIDE IS TIME

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OWN	1.	17	100.0	100.0
	0.	90	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	

Chairman Hua believes that time is on China's(and the Third World's) side for two reasons. First, Hua perceives the international environment to be changing in his favor: "the international situation is developing in a direction most favourable to the people of all countries but unfavourable to imperialism and hegemonism." (47:7) It is favorable because liberation struggles are on the rise and "the international united front against ... the superpowers is broadening." (49:40) Hence, with the passage of time, China's position, (and that of the Third World in general), improves vis-a-vis the superpowers'. Second, Hua realizes that China is still underdeveloped and therefore, at a disadvantage via-a-vis the Soviet Union, in particular.

Although Hua speaks of "racing against time to strengthen ourselves economically and heighten our defensive capabilities," (58:14) it is clear that the passage of time means the opportunity to improve China's position with regard to the Soviet Union.

3. Is the Political Future Predictable?

Answers to this question serve as the basis for identifying the actor's core beliefs concerning the role of history and chance in human affairs.

a. Is Political Life Capricious or Predictable?

Typologies include: 1) Predictable 2) Capricious.

TABLE 23

IS THE POLITICAL FUTURE PREDICTABLE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
PREDICTABLE	1.	12	100.0	100.0
	0.	95	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Hua clearly believes that political life is predictable. He is a firm believer of dialectics and Marxian evolution and therefore the major trends of history are predictable. War, for example, is not only predictable it is irresistible. "Their (superpowers) rivalry will lead to a conflagration some day. This is independent of man's will." (7:21)

b. What Aspects of Political Life are Predictable?

Typologies include: 1) Historical Development 2) State of the International System 3) Opponent's Behavior 4) Policy Outcomes 5) Specific Events.

TABLE 24

WHAT ASPECTS OF POLITICAL LIFE ARE PREDICTABLE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT	1.	24	72.7	72.7
POLICY OUTCOME	4.	2	6.1	78.8
WAR	5.	7	21.2	100.0
	0.	74	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Historical development is clearly the most predictable aspect of political life. Hua continually refers to historical development as an indisputable and known law.

> "Judging by the laws of historical development, aggression bears the seed of defeat, and the aggressors are inevitably punished by history." (6:9)

The following quotes capture the intensity of Hua's belief in the existence of a law of historical development and hence, its predictability.

> "This (socialism) is an inexorable trend of history and no reactionary forces can hold it back." (58:40)

> " ... the historical destiny of the dictatorship of the proletariat." (18:19)

c. What is the Degree of Predictability?

Typologies include: 1) Certainty 2) Probability 3) Uncertainty.

TABLE 25

DEGREE OF PREDICTABILITY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CERTAIN	1.	26	96.3	96.3
PROBABLE	2.	1	3.7	100.0
	0.	80	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Hua predominantly uses one of six phrases which optimize the concept of certainty when referring to the predictability of political life: 1) "Never" 2) "Inevitably" 3) Irresistable" 4) "Inexorable" 5) "Independent of man's will" 6) "Always."

For example: "However strong and mighty the aggressors may seem for the moment, the end result is always contrary to their expectations, and they will never escape their doom." (6:9)

4. How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over Historical Development?

Answers to this question provide the basis for constructing an actor's core beliefs concerning a leader's role in manipulating the course of history.

a. What is the Role of the Leader?

A leader may actively use politics to guide historical development. He may merely intervene when feasible. Perhaps, his role is one of mediator between contending forces or simply one of identification of major trends in historical

development. It is equally possible that a leader should avoid any intervention in historical development. Typologies include: 1) Actively Use Politics 2) Intervene When Feasible 3) Mediate Between Contending Forces 4) Discern Historical Trends 5) Avoid Intervention 6) Control Uncertain, But Must Act.

TABLE 26

ROLE OF LEADER IN SHAPING HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ACTIVE	1.	16	100.0	100.0
	0.	91	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		107	100.0	

Given Hua's firm beliefs concerning the predictability of historical development, it is not surprising to find that he views a leader's role as one of active participation. One has to look no further than Hua's predecessor, Mao Tse-tung, to find one of the foremost advocates of developmental control. Mao believed in dialectics, and that through careful applications of antithesis, a leader could guide history. (131:89) One such example was the cultural revolution. Hua speaks of this event and Mao's position in it as follows: "In the light of the historical lesson of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union and the real danger of such a restoration in China, Chairman Mao ... prersonally launched and led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." (49:38) It must be noted, however, that almost all references in this category are in praise laden

descriptions of Mao as a leader. The frequency of these references decreases over time.

B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

1. What is the Best Approach for Selecting Goals or Objectives for Political Action?

Answers to this question serve as the basis for ascertaining an actor's core beliefs regarding the selection of, and interrelationships between political goals.

a. How Should One Establish the Goals for Political Action?

A leader may ascribe to one of three general approaches: 1) a comprehensive framework or blueprint which will delineate precisely how to attain major aspirations, 2) a piecemeal approach which allows the leader to separate issues and evaluate the opportunities afforded by each, independently and 3) some mixture of both of the above. Typologies include: 1) Comprehensive Framework 2) Mixed Strategy 3) Individual Issues.

TABLE 27

ESTABLISH GOALS FOR POLITICAL ACTION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK	1.	40	100.0	100.0
	0.	143	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

As would be expected from an avowed Communist, Chairman Hua refers to the necessity of a comprehensive framework for

establishing and achieving goals. To Hua, the concept of a framework or master plan is synonomous with his use of the term "line." All activities, whether political, economic, military or social are guided and directed by "the line." In 1963, he first referred to "the general line for building socialism" (52:8) and although the nature of the "line" may have changed from time to time, the necessity for having one and following it has been consistent. Most references are to "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" (12:16) which carefully outlined everything from foreign policy (The Differentiation of the Three Worlds) to agriculture. More recently, the line is referred to as "the line of the 11th Party Congress." (30:7)

b. What is the Nature of the Goals to be Sought?

Goals may be optimal or feasible. The former views the compromising of major goals to achieve short term gains as running the risk of losing any chance for the attainment of the major goal. The latter states that it is more appropriate to advance toward a major goal one step at a time. Consequently, it is permissible to subdivide a major goal into a sequence of lesser ones. Typologies include: 1) Optimal 2) Feasible 3) Mixed.

TABLE 28

NATURE OF GOALS TO BE SOUGHT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OPTIMAL	1.	8	66.7	66.7
FEASIBLE	2.	4	33.3	100.0
	0.	171	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Several of the preceding conclusions are applicable to this category. Because Hua views political interaction with a zero-sum perspective, is adamantly opposed to any form of appeasement and tends to be highly optimistic about long term success, it is not surprising that he would favor optimal goals. A case in point is Taiwan. Hua is adamant about its return and opposes any compromise on the issue even if it would generate economic concessions from the United States. "The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's internal affair, an internal affair which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever. If relations between the two countries (PRC-US) are to be normalized, the United States must ... (do the things she ultimately has done)." (58:39)

c. What are the Paths to the Achievement of Goals?

Any actor may believe that there is only one correct path to success from which any deviation could well prove disastrous. Conversely, an actor may see multiple paths as providing various degrees of probability for success. Typologies include: 1) Single Correct Path 2) Multiple Paths.

TABLE 29

PATHS TO ACHIEVE ULTIMATE GOALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
SINGLE CORRECT PATH	1.	72	93.5	93.5
MULTIPLE PATHS	2.	5	6.5	100.0
	0.	106	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Chairman Hua believes in the necessity of following the "line" in the pursuit of all goals, whether domestic or international. He refers to Mao as having "formulated the only correct line, principles and policies for each stage of the Chinese revolution." (18:15) This "correctness" is continually reasserted. " ... all this forcefully testifies to the complete correctness of the strategic decision adopted by the Party Central Committee." (15:10) Not only does Hua consider the "line" to be the only correct one, he believes that it must be rigidly followed. "Both internally and internationally we must unswervingly forge ahead along the course chartered by Chairman Hua." (53:44)

d. Do Value Conflicts Exist in the Pursuit of Goals?

This is essentially a question concerning the need for major goal tradeoffs. If the leader perceives two or more goals as incapable of simultaneous achievement, some degree of tradeoff is necessary. If all goals are perceived as compatible and/or reinforcing, no tradeoff is required. Typologies include: 1) All Goals Compatible 2) Tradeoffs Necessary.

TABLE 30

COPING WITH VALUE CONFLICTS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ALL GOALS COMPATIBLE	1.	2	100.0	100.0
	0.	181	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Data for this category is inconclusive. The only observation which can reasonably be made is that Hua avoids addressing any existing value conflicts. Whether this is a result of a belief that none actually exists, or is a conscious avoidance of the subject, cannot be ascertained.

2. How are the Goals of Action Pursued Most Effectively?

Answers to this question provide the basis for ascertaining an actor's core beliefs concerning the operationalization of political goals.

a. What Approach Should be Used in the Pursuit of Goals?

An actor may pursue goals by making careful preparations (prepare ground) or he may take action as a way of testing its feasibility (try and see). An actor may utilize a bit by bit approach, settling for small gains along the way (incremental) or he may believe in full scale all out pursuit (blitzkrieg). Typologies include: 1) Prepare Ground 2) Try and See) 3) Incremental 4) Blitzkrieg.

TABLE 31

APPROACH TO PURSUIT OF GOALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
PREPARE GROUND	1.	20	74.1	74.1
TRY-AND-SEE	2.	1	3.7	77.8
INCREMENTAL APPROACH	3.	5	18.5	96.3
BLITZKRIEG	4.	1	3.7	100.0
	0.	156	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Premier Hua tends to favor the prior preparation approach to the pursuit of international goals. Because the spread of hegemonism and the threat of war are the international issues of primary concern to Hua, he refers repeatedly to the necessity for preparation. " ... we must be prepared for any possible contingency." (57:E12) To Hua, unpreparedness means vulnerability. "We believe that the outbreak of war can be put off, but then the people of all countries must ... prepare against all eventualities. In this way, even if the superpowers gamble with war, the people of the world will not be caught in a vulnerable state of unpreparedness." (58:36)

When addressing domestic goals, however, Hua often references the incremental approach. He speaks of "a step by step improvement in the people's material well-being and cultural life" (10:9) and of "(reaching) our goals (modernization by 2000) step by step." (10:15)

b. Under What Circumstances Should One Push Harder, Be Prepared to Compromise, or to Retreat from a Previously Held Position?

The major thrust of this category concerns broad range strategy concepts rather than specific strategy applications (which are addressed in instrumental belief #5). Typologies include: 1) Push Harder 2) Accommodate 3) Pull Back. Because Hua refers only to circumstances and general strategy concepts related to pushing harder, the data was aggregated around the most cited circumstances: 1) unity 2) anti-appeasement 3) war preparations 4) resolute struggle.

TABLE 32

STRATEGY FOR PUSHING HARDER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
UNITY	1.	6	54.5	54.5
ANTI APPEASEMENT	2.	2	18.2	72.7
WAR PREPARATIONS	3.	1	9.1	81.8
RESOLUTE STRUGGLE	4.	2	18.2	100.0
	0.	172	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Because Hua is "opposed to appeasement," (30:E8) it is not surprising that he would speak only of pushing harder as a viable strategy. To Hua, the strategy of pushing harder is largely a function of the degree of support and unity. As will be discussed in category I-5, unity occupies a lofty position in Hua's conceptualization of power. Basically, the greater the unity, the greater one can push the opponent. "The people of all countries must close ranks and resolutely struggle against the war machinations of the superpowers." (58:36)

c. What Type of Action is Preferred?

Is action undertaken by one nation, or is action taken in concert with other nations or organizations preferred? Typologies include: 1) Unilateral 2) Multilateral.

TABLE 33

TYPE OF ACTION PREFERRED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
MULTILATERAL	2.	10	100.0	100.0
	0.	173	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	183	100.0	

Again, the notion of unity occupies a lofty position of importance for Hua. Because unity is tied to his perception of power it is understandable that he would prefer multilateral action. He repeatedly stresses the necessity of "win(ning) over as many allies as possible" (49:41) and "form(ing) the broadest possible united front against superpower hegemonism." (16:6)

3. How are the Risks of Political Action Calculated, Controlled and Accepted?

Answers to this question provide the basis for ascertaining an actor's core beliefs regarding the feasibility of risk-taking and the manner in which risk situations are interpreted.

a. How is Risk Assessed?

The risks of a particular action may be assessed in terms of that particular undertaking or, in terms of one's major goals or, solely in terms of the specific tactic employed. (For example, the risks of a bombing raid would be assessed only in terms of its prospects for success rather than in terms of the current campaign or ultimate victory).

Typologies include: 1) Comprehensive Framework 2) Specific Undertaking 3) Specific Tactics

TABLE 34

ASSESSMENT OF RISK

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
WITHIN FRAMEWORK	1.	2	100.0	100.0
	0.	181	MISSING	100.0
		183	100.0	

Because Hua so rarely discusses the concept of risk, the results of this entire category are inconclusive. His few references to risk are, however, couched in terms of a comprehensive goal. "No matter what may happen on the international scene, the Chinese people will, as in the past, remain united with the Korean people, and fight together and win victories together with them." (20:A8)

4. What is the Best Timing of Action to Advance One's Interests?

Answers to this question provide the basis for ascertaining an actor's beliefs concerning the relationships between the timing of action and ultimate success.

a. How Important is Timing in the Achievement of Major, Long Term Aspirations?

Timing is considered important if the success of failure of the goal depends heavily upon its preciseness. Typologies include: 1) Important 2) Not Important.

b. How Important is Timing in the Success of Specific Policy Undertakings?

Typologies include: 1) Important 2) Not Important.

TABLE 35

IMPORTANCE OF TIMING TO ACHIEVE MAJOR GOALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
IMPORTANT	1.	8	80.0	80.0
NOT IMPORTANT	2.	2	20.0	100.0
	0.	173	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

TABLE 36

IMPORTANCE OF TIMING TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
IMPORTANT	1.	6	100.0	100.0
	0.	177	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Hua believes that timing is important in the pursuit of both major goals and specific policies. As a "revolutionary" leader, Hua recognizes the necessity and benefit of seizing opportunities as they arise. "Every communist, every revolutionary and every patriot should be clear about the situation, (and) seize the present opportune moment." (57:E11)

There is a sense of urgency in most of his references to timing. "(We must) race against time and fight for speed and step up our army's ... modernization." (14:10) " ... it is imperative to convene the Fifth National Peoples Congress before the due date." (11:4) References which indicated that timing was not important were in conjunction with outcomes which Hua believed to be inevitable.

c. Under What Circumstances is Action Required, Permissible or Prohibited?

Typologies include: 1) Required 2) Permissible 3) Prohibited. Hua refers only to one primary circumstance under which action is required and that is, if China is attacked.

> "(We) must go all out to strengthen preparedness against war and be ready at all times to wipe out any enemy that dares to invade us." (58:39)

5. What is the Utility and Role of Different Means for Advancing One's Interests? What Resources Can One Draw Upon in the Effort to Advance One's Interests?

Answers to these questions provide the basis for ascertaining an actor's tactical preferences and perceptions concerning the nature of political power.

a. What Tactics are Used?

This category is concerned with specific tactics -- either the most appropriate tactic or the least appropriate tactic. Typologies for Hua's most appropriate tactics include: 1) Learn from Developed Nations 2) Unity 3) Rely on "Peoples War" Concept 4) Resolute Struggle 5) Improve Combat Strength.

TABLE 37

MOST APPROPRIATE TACTIC

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
LEARN FROM DEVELOPED	1.	5	13.9	13.9
UNITY	2.	25	69.4	83.3
RELY ON PEOPLES WAR	3.	1	2.8	86.1
RESOLUTE STRUGGLE	4.	3	8.3	94.4
IMPROVE COMBAT STRENGTH	5.	2	5.6	100.0
	0.	147	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

Chairman Hua ascribes predominantly to two general tactics in the quest to guarantee Chinese security and defeat the hegemonists. He summarizes the importance of the first by saying that "unity is strength, unity means victory." (14:12) He believes that "there is a strategic task common to the people of the world over" (7:21) and that is to "consolidate and expand the international united front against hegemony." (7:21) Not only is such a tactic useful to China and the Third World, to Hua it is absolutely essential. "A new world war can be postponed so long as the people of the world maintain their unity." (50:8)

Hua believes that ultimate victory will only be achieved once China has become a modern state. "Only by building up a modern agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology can we provide our socialist system with a

powerful material base, steadily consolidate and develop this system, effectively defeat capitalism at home and find ourselves in a stronger position to resist aggression from abroad." (51:8) Yet Hua realizes that rapid achievement of the Four Modernizations (currently a high goal) necessitates a tactic heretofore unaccustomed in China -- learning from the ways of the West.

> "As for natural science and technology, we are behind advanced world levels. We admit our backwardness but we refuse to lag behind; we must catch up. This requires us to be good at absorbing whatever is good in things foreign, take them over and turn them to our account and combine our learning from foreign countries with our own inventiveness so that we can catch up with and surpass advanced world levels as soon as possible." (51:12)

b. How is Power Conceptualized?

This category is concerned with whether power is believed to be strictly a function of military might or something else. It is also concerned with perceptions of available resources which are directly power enhancing and resources whose unavailability is power inhibiting. Coding data for the conception of power was aggregated into the following typologies: 1) Military Only 2) Unity of the People 3) World Opinion 4) Culture 5) Allies 6) "Peoples War" Concept 7) Manpower.

Coding data for those available resources considered as power enhancing was aggregated into the following typologies: 1) Superiority of Socialism 2) Manpower 3) Revolutionary Spirit 4) Unity 5) Determination 5) Area. Coding data for unavailable resources which would have enhanced a nation's

power was aggregated into the following typologies: 1) Economically Underdeveloped 2) Lack of Modern Weapons.

TABLE 38

CONCEPTION OF POWER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
MILITARY ONLY	1.	1	10.0	10.0
UNITY OF PEOPLE	2.	4	40.0	50.0
WORLD OPINION	3.	1	10.	60.0
CULTURE	4.	1	10.0	70.0
ALLIES	5.	1	10.0	80.0
PEOPLES WAR CONCEPT	6.	1	10.0	90.0
MANPOWER	7.	1	10.0	100.0
	0.	173	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

TABLE 39

RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR ENHANCING POWER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
SUPERIORITY OF SOCIALISM	1.	6	26.1	26.1
MANPOWER	2.	8	34.8	60.9
REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT	3.	2	8.7	69.6
UNITY	4.	4	17.4	87.0
DETERMINATION	5.	2	8.7	95.7
AREA	6.	1	4.3	100.0
	0.	160	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		183	100.0	

The resources which Hua feels will further China's political ends the most are socialism, manpower and unity. The superiority of the socialist system is asserted frequently: "our socialist political system and economic system are far superior to the capitalists." (10:8) According to Hua, really powerful combat effectiveness "comes from a close integration of people who have a high level of proletarian consciousness with modern weapons and equipment." (14:10) This is an important notion, for although Hua admits that China currently lacks modern weaponry, the fact that China is socialist means that when China does modernize she will be comparatively more powerful than the capitalists.

On a number of occasions, Hua alludes to China's most abundant resource, manpower, as being a source of power.

> "The most powerful base and inexhaustible source of strength in our country are the masses of the people in their hundreds of millions." (51:9)

> "An enemy that dares to intrude will certainly be drowned in the vast ocean of people's war." (55:AA8)

That same unity which Hua stresses on the international scene, is cited domestically as a current source of power. He says that China's goal of the Four Modernizations will certainly be met because of "the close unity of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country." (10:15)

The resource whose absence most directly inhibits China's power is a solid, modern economic base. Hua freely acknowledges China's retarded position. "At present, China is still a developing socialist country and has limited material

means." (77:4) An outgrowth of this underdevelopment which directly impinges upon China's territorial security and position vis-a-vis the superpowers' is the lack of modern weaponry and equipment.

b. What are the Sources of Knowledge Cited in Support of the Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs?

Typologies include: 1) Ideology 2) Trends (for example, defense budgets, Gross National Product) 3) Experience 4) History 5) Specific Events 6) Faith (the point must be accepted on faith).

TABLE 41

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
THEORY/IDEOLOGY	1.	60	36.3	36.3
TRENDS	2.	8	4.8	41.1
HISTORY	3.	77	46.6	87.7
SPECIFIC EVENTS	4.	17	10.3	98
EXPERIENCE	5.	2	1.2	99.4
FAITH	6.	1	.6	100
	0.	138	MISSING	100
TOTAL		303	100.0	

By and large, Hua cites historical events and Maoist ideology to substantiate his beliefs. For example, "History has time and again proved that expansionists never come to a good end, such was the case with Hitler, and the hegemonism of today will come to no better end." (1:5) Also, "So long

as social-imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable."

It is interesting to note that historical precedents are used primarily to substantiate internationally centered beliefs while Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology tends to be used to justify internal assertions.

V. STABILITY

In refining the operational code construct, Alexander George concluded that it would tend to be resistant to change. (166:216) This resistance would be accentuated by personality rigidities and by a tendency to perceive and to deal with current problems based on historical interpretations. Change would therefore occur only as a result of some particularly traumatic event, or very gradually over time.

An observation made by Walter Mischel lends support to this assertion: "There is a great deal of evidence that our cognitive constructions about ourselves and the world -- our personal theories about ourselves and those around us ... often are extremely stable and highly resistant to change." (183:17)

Hua Guofeng is an especially significant case for testing this stability assumption. Because Hua attributes historical precedent as his primary source of knowledge, his code would tend to be firm. On the other hand, his reputation as a balance artist or one able to skillfully judge the relative merits and popularity of issues would at the very least imply the latent ability to smoothly and rapidly alter his stance. This leads to an interesting question: Is the operational code developed in this thesis a true representation of his private beliefs or merely a politically necessary position? If it is indeed the latter, change should be evident in at

least one of several key time frames. For example, a valid argument could be made asserting that prior to 1976 Hua merely parroted the Maoist code out of political necessity (survival). If this were true, a shift should be apparent after Mao's death and Hua's subsequent catapult to power, or after the fall of the Gang of Four. Another time frame to observe would be the resurrection of Deng Xiaoping. A lack of significant change would lend credence to both the assumption of stability and most importantly to the reality of the code developed by this thesis.

In order to analyze the continuity of Hua's operational code, all data was coded and stored in a computer by date. The frequencies of responses coded for each question in each belief category were aggregated by year and in the form of two subprograms: before Mao's death (prior to 9 September 1976) and after Mao's death (9 September 1976 to 31 December 1978). Appendix D represents the results of this tabulation using raw frequency and percentage of response (in parentheses).

The results demonstrate a very consistent operational code. The data comprising the code consisted of statements covering his career primarily from his appointment as Vice Premier and First Vice Chairman through Premier and Chairman. It spans a time frame which includes Mao dominance, a senile Mao in a figure head position, the Gang of Four controversy, Hua control and the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping, yet throughout this varied and turbulent period, the code remains overwhelmingly constant.

Because the coded data is entirely of a nominal and ordinal nature, high level statistical tests of comparison were not possible. The lower order techniques which were applicable, Sign Test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test were used.

The Sign Test was run two ways in an attempt to overcome some inherent difficulties in the nature of the operational code data. Method I was structured on the percentage of responses attributed to each category for each belief. Method II was structured on raw frequency data. For each method, the entire operational code belief system of one period was compared with the entire operational code belief system of the other. Additionally, each individual belief category was tested separately with its twin in the other period.

With a null hypothesis, H_o:p=.5 (the two groups are the same), Method I failed to reject the null hypothesis while Method II rejected the null hypothesis. It must be pointed out that neither method was fully appropriate. Method II failed to adequately take n (number of responses) into account. A great majority of the plus signs were direct results of greater n rather than any formal change in choice of response. Method I controlled changes in n by using percentages. Hence, if the response "conflictual" were cited fifteen times for period one and twenty-five times for period two, this would greatly influence Method II even though they both may represent 100% of the responses for that category, which would mean no change in preference!

In testing to see if any of the individual beliefs had changed, Method I failed to reject the null hypothesis in every case (in other words, the beliefs were the same for every period). Method II rejected the null hypothesis (at .05 level) for philosophical belief 1b and philosophical belief 4. However, this rejection of H_o was primarily a result of the inapplicability of Method II.

A higher order Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test was conducted to determine if there had been any significant change in any of the ordinally structured categories between the two periods. Only one category proved to be significantly different: What is the likely response of an adversary to one's own conciliatory action? This variable's significance can be attributed to the lack of response for period one.

There is no significant difference between the beliefs expressed prior to 9 September 1976 and those expressed after 9 September 1976. This finding is based on three factors:

1) Failure of a sign test to find any significant difference

2) Failure of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test to find any significant difference in the ordinal measure categories

3) Coders review of the coding data which appears strikingly similar between periods with no obvious alterations of choice categories.

The only apparent differences are minor and consist of a slight tendency on the part of Hua to downgrade his perception of opponents (primarily the United States) from destructionist to expansionist. There is some indication that the

hostility with the superpowers may be more limited in nature than previously assumed and borrowing technology from the West has become a publically viable policy.

Aggregating frequencies by year also fails to illuminate any appreciable change. Minor variations do occur, but this is to be expected. Aggregating an operational code on such a small scale runs the risk of distortion. Some of the variances are interesting and can be related to peculiarities or events of that year. For example, 1976 proved to be a highly optimistic (unqualified) year. This was probably politically essential to aid in weathering the effects of Mao's death and the turbulence of the Gang of Four controversy, and in an attempt to sell Hua as a symbol of unity.

1978 was a year marked by an increase in references to potential war and an increase in Hua's preoccupation with, and verbal lambasting of the Soviet Union. It must be observed, however, that Hua's unprecedented trip to Eastern Europe in August, 1978 provided him with an excellent forum. Additionally, most of the references in this regard occurred during that trip.

1978 also marked an increase in references to the necessity for borrowing technology from the West. This is directly related to the changing of the "line" at the Fifth National Peoples Congress in February, 1978, to the Four Modernizations. It may also reflect the rapid resurrection of a strong rival, Deng Xiaoping whose career is noted for a strong emphasis on modernization.

VI. TOWARD A TYPOLOGY

In a critique of the "cognitive mapping" (158) approach to political analysis, Thomas Trumble questioned both its internal and external validity on the grounds that existing studies are descriptive rather than comparative. (191:3) Most operational code studies completed to date have been more concerned with describing a detailed set of beliefs than in identifying and analyzing linkages among these beliefs. (172:150) The very concept of a belief system assumes that the subject's beliefs form patterned ways of thinking about history and politics. Every belief system has a belief hierarchy ranging from the least important to the most important. These "most important" or core beliefs are those which affect the range of response to other questions which compose the operational code. It is the existence of these stable, primary beliefs which enable system typologies to be constructed. Such a typology would provide a framework to assist an analyst in comparing belief systems.

Holsti depicts four areas of study in which the operational code construct would prove useful: political socialization, decision making and two types of comparative elite studies (i.e., two leaders during the same time frame or two leaders in different time frames). Whether the code serves as an independent or dependent variable in such studies, analysis would be greatly enhanced by focusing part of the

comparison on types of belief systems in conjunction with the detailed focusing on the subject's individual beliefs. (175:153)

To date, little work has been done in this area. The only definitive steps in this direction were made by Holsti under contract to the National Science Foundation. Two points of importance emerged from his analysis of typologies:

1. Certain types of beliefs do form clusters with greater regularity than would be expected by chance.
2. His evidence supported the proposition that the first philosophical belief is among the most salient of these beliefs.

The two most significant limitations of the study were first, an insufficient number of operational code studies were included in testing the typology and second, the data was probably skewed by an overrepresentation of American leaders (8 of 12 cases), Western democracies (11 of 12 cases) and developed societies (all 12 cases). (175:270) Although the inclusion of Hua Guofeng as a test case would be of marginal value to the numbers limitation, it would provide a rather unique addition in terms of the subject's background and, if positively correlated, would lend more credence to Holsti's typology.

Authors of several operational code studies have suggested that philosophical belief 1(a) was one of the most prominent candidates for a "master belief" or one which is likely to constrain (or dominate) other elements of the belief system. (175:156) In devising his typology, Holsti used this belief

as the pivot. The typology system centers around the perception of the political universe and is two dimensionally structured. Either conflict is permanent, or it is temporary, in which case the subject implies that given certain conditions (i.e., world communism) the political environment would be harmonious. The second dimension of the typology matrix concerns the primary sources of conflict. Figure 1 depicts Holsti's typology matrix.

	WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE?	
WHAT ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT?	Harmonious (conflict is temporary)	Conflictual (conflict is permanent)
Human nature	A	D
Attributes of nations	B	E
International system	C	F

Figure 1

Typology Categories

Because Hua is a communist, he falls within the type B orientation which holds that, because the sources of conflict are to be found in the attributes of certain nations or classes of nations, the necessary and sufficient conditions of peace are their reform or elimination.

To test the typology, Hua Guofeng's beliefs will be compared with Holsti's complete category B typology across the

full spectrum of beliefs by means of a rough goodness of fit test. Each belief is scored with a code representing a rough estimate of the degree to which it is in agreement with the hypothesized response:

++ very substantial agreement
+ agreement on balance
0 insufficient or inconclusive evidence
- disagreement on balance
-- very substantial disagreement

Holsti's study utilized three type B subjects:

1. Kurt Schumacher (German Socialist leader)
2. John Foster Dulles (note: the Wilsonian vision of world democracy falls in this category)
3. the Bolsheviks.

All three were contrasted with Hua Guofeng's operational code. The case of Kurt Schumacher provides the closest match and is therefore included in Appendix E. (157)

All cases would not be expected to fit even a proven typology uniformly. Deviations could occur because the linkages among a subject's beliefs arise not only from logical consideration, but also from "psycho-logic" (154) and self-esteem. (185) As seen in Table 42, however, Hua's operational code adequately fits the type B typology. The goodness of fit is particularly close for all of the philosophical beliefs while somewhat sporadic for the instrumental beliefs. This observation regarding the instrumental beliefs is generally true for each of the type B subjects and in many respects, it is true for all cases thus far applied to the Holsti typology. (175:266)

TABLE 42

SUMMARY OF RESULTS, COMPARING PREDICTED AND ACTUAL OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS (175:266)

Operational Code Belief	Hua Guofeng	Bolsheviks	John Foster Dulles	Kurt Schumacher
P-1(a)	++	++	++	++
P-1(b)	++	++	++	++
P-2	++	++	++	++
P-3	++	++	++	++
P-4	++	++	+	+
I-1	++	++	+	++
I-2	-	+	0	+
I-3	0	++	+	+
I-4	++	+	+	++
I-5	0	+	+	0

One could conclude from this observation that perhaps the philosophical beliefs are more highly dominated by one's perception of the political universe than the instrumental beliefs. If this were the case, perhaps the inclusion of a third dimension (i.e., the selection of goals or role) would create a more durable set of typology categories.

Table 42 demonstrates the close similarity on a generalized level, between the operational codes of Hua Guofeng and Kurt Schumacher. Excluding instrumental belief #3 (risk) due to a lack of data for both cases, there remains but two areas of discordance: instrumental belief #2 and instrumental belief #5. In instrumental belief #5 (tactics) there is an inconclusive fit between each case and the hypothesized response. However, if compared together, the two cases agree on balance. Both believe that unity, public support and the masses are essential ingredients of power. Instrumental belief #2, on the other hand, presents a more significant difference. Hua appears more pragmatic than any of the other type B subjects. Although he would agree that one cannot abandon an ultimate goal, he falls far short of advocating a "push to the limit" strategy for the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. He is committed to complete and thorough contingency planning and keenly aware of the need for strength (allies) before any physical confrontation with a strong opponent.

The most significant point of discord with the typology (and Schumacher) lies in the use of an incrementalist approach.

To Schumacher, this strategy is especially inappropriate while to Hua and to some extent, the Bolsheviks, it is useful and reasonable. It must be noted, however, that Schumacher spent his entire career in the opposition with no real control of, nor responsibility for Germany's actions. It is understandably easier to speak in terms of pushing to the limit from such a position. Hua on the other hand, became the leader of an enormous and populous country. The realities and responsibilities of such a role could well breed a degree of pragmatism and could help explain this point of discordance.

Perhaps role has a more significant, if not dominant impact on the instrumental beliefs. This notion certainly has some face validity. However, due to the rather limited volume of operational code studies thus far completed, little can be done in this regard. An effort was made to link the role of Secretary of State (in the cases of Acheson, Dulles, Kissinger and Byrnes) with the typology categories without significant success. (175:268)

VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. OPERATIONAL CODE SUMMARY

1. Philosophical Beliefs

Not only does conflict thrive in the current international environment, but it is intensifying and is protracted in nature. International conflict is a zero-sum interaction with the elimination of the opponent being the only permanent solution. Conflict is a functional and necessary prerequisite for the realization of China's primary goals.

There are two causal dimensions at the root of international conflict: nationalism and standard power politics. Both dimensions are related because of the role played in each by the superpowers. The first dimension views today's conflict from the perspective of superpower imperialism over the Third World, while the latter dimension views conflict as a head to head rivalry between the superpowers. The struggle of the Third World against imperialism must be a united effort. Not only is nationalism and anti-imperialism an honored and necessary effort, it is an irresistible development. The primary source of world conflict is superpower rivalry. This contention extends throughout the world and affects all countries either directly, as in Africa, or indirectly, with the growing threat of war.

There are three general contributing approaches toward the temporary attainment of world peace. The first is com-

munication. Among friends, conflicts can be resolved through discussion. Other aspects of communication include state visits and various exchange programs. On a more general scale, one can only hope to establish and maintain peace through mutual adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Temporary peace among unfriendly or hostile countries (for example, with superpowers and others who fail to heed the Five Principles) requires the third approach: balance of power. A proper balance of power scheme includes a united Third World (including China) which will effectively oppose superpower hegemonism. Unity is the key to the balance. A united and unaligned Europe is also desirable. Although superpower contention is the greatest source of turmoil in today's international environment, the environment itself can no longer be considered to be polarized. The growth in the number of nonaligned countries and increased Third World unity are proof of a collapsing polarism and emerging pluralism. In the context of international relations, all current conflicts are small manifestations of a larger, historical conflict: imperialism versus the underdeveloped peoples of the world.

The Soviet Union is destructionist in nature and intent upon global supremacy. The United States is expansionist in nature. There are several sources simultaneously driving the selection and pursuit of their goals. Precedent for present goals run abundant in history. Imperialism as a form of capitalist ideology (and Soviet revisionism) also contributes to the superpowers' aggressive drives and deepening rivalry.

Conflict with the Soviet Union and capitalist society is permanent and of an all-encompassing and ideologically based nature. Not only is this hostility of a permanent nature, it is uncontrollable. Any attempt at conciliation will be either ignored or taken advantage of by the opponent. However, if confronted by policies of firmness they would be forced to back down because they are merely paper tigers.

The Soviet Union and the United States believe that conflict is not only inevitable but that it is a desirable route to the attainment of goals. This is especially true in the case of the Soviet Union. War is therefore inevitable. The superpowers use an optimizing strategy in their desire to dominate the world. Their goals are unrealistic because they lack the resolve and power to reach them.

China is defensively oriented. The first dimension of China's defensive goals concerns preventing Soviet expansion, specifically at China's expense, but also on a global scale. The second dimension concerns modernization. In order to accomplish this particular goal, China requires a prolonged peaceful international environment. Because there can be no peace while the superpowers are free to pursue their expansionist policies, the urgency and preeminence of opposing hegemony is self-evident.

Optimism is appropriate because of: 1. the correctness of the current line 2. the superiority of socialism 3. the resourcefulness of the Chinese people 4. historical precedent.

Time is on China's side for two reasons. First, the international environment is changing in a favorable direction. It is favorable because liberation struggles are on the rise and the international united front against hegemony is broadening.

Second, China is still underdeveloped and therefore at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, in particular. The passage of time affords the opportunity to improve China's position.

Political life is predictable with historical development being the most predictable aspect of political life. History is evolving in accordance with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory so the political future is indisputable and certain. Historical precedent can and should be used to explain and justify current actions. A leader must actively strive to manipulate history and guide his people in a favorable direction.

2. Instrumental Beliefs

A comprehensive framework is necessary for establishing and achieving goals. All activities whether political, economic, military or social must be guided and directed by a detailed plan or line. Goals should be optimal. In order to achieve such goals, the line must be rigidly followed.

When formulating strategies all eventualities must be investigated and considered. Unpreparedness means vulnerability and must be avoided. Incrementally structured frameworks are the most productive.

One should never be hesitant to push an opponent providing he has the strength to back it up. Unity and support are vital components of strength therefore, multilateral action has significantly greater impact in the international environment.

Timing is important in the pursuit of both major goals and specific policies. Opportunities must be recognized and seized as they arise.

There are two primary tactics to use in the quest to guarantee China's security and the ultimate defeat of the hegemonists. The first is the forging of a strong bond of Third World unity opposing hegemonist aggression. This is important in the short term to allow China time to complete modernization. Ultimate victory can only be achieved once China has become a modern state. Rapid achievement of modernization requires the tactic of learning from Western advances which requires open and friendly cooperation.

Power is composed of many contributing elements none of which is dominant. It is a blend of a modern, well equipped armed force, a strong material base and most importantly the active support of a united population.

Socialism, manpower, unity and spirit are China's most valuable resources because they directly enhance China's power.

The most significant limitation on China's power is an underdeveloped economy. An outgrowth of this underdevelopment which directly impinges upon China's territorial security

and position vis-a-vis her opponents' is the lack of modern weaponry and equipment.

B. OBSERVATIONS

It is very important to reaffirm that beliefs do not constitute a set of decision rules which are automatically applied by policy makers during situations of choice. One to one relationships do not necessarily exist between operational codes and foreign policy actions. The actual relationship is quite complex and also includes the affects of role and belief variations among in house deicison makers (even in an authoritarian state). The operational code is only one of several intervening variables which shape and constrain decision making. It is utilized as "a means of orienting (a decision maker) to the environment; as a lens or prism through which information is processed and given meaning; as a diagnostic scheme; as one means of coping with the cognitive constraints on rationality; and as a source of guidelines that may guide or bound - but necessarily determine - policy prescriptions and choices." (175:25) The operational code defines the individual's perception of his environment, the scheme by which problems are identified and favored methods of problem solving. This is particularly true during times of crisis.

Keeping the above caveat in mind, several observations based upon Hua's code and background can be made concerning probable trends in Chinese foreign policy. Without greater knowledge of inner Politburo workings or insight into the

operational codes of other high ranking figures, most notable Deng Xiaoping, the author hesitates to use the word prediction. What can be observed are trends and policies which conform favorably to Hua's operational code and thereby are likely to merit his support.

1. It is clear from Hua's operational code that China should bide its time and gain strength. Hua believes that conflict is necessary for the attainment of China's ultimate goals. Moreover, he feels that war is inevitable. However, China's substandard position militarily vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was graphically demonstrated by a rather poor showing during the Viet Nam invasion. Hua does not condone action without sufficient strength to ensure success. Consequently, to Hua, the time is not right for any direct confrontation. What is required is the safe passage of time to enable China to advance and improve her position for the inevitable confrontation. To advance, China needs the industrial expertise of the West. The United States is perceived as considerably less threatening to China than the Soviet Union. Therefore, what is required is a marriage of convenience between China and the United States and/or Western Europe. China can provide a vast market for capitalist enterprises while being assisted in advancing in the industrial, technological and military spheres. Hua's code clearly indicates that such a policy would only be temporary. He leaves no doubt about ultimate line-ups and the final victor.

2. Reconciliation with the Soviet Union would not be in keeping with Hua's code. Hua continually expresses distrust and paranoia concerning Soviet intentions. Hua believes that Soviet goals of domination especially over China are well founded in history, and history is the primary source of Hua's beliefs. Consequently, a change in leadership resulting from Brezhnev's death would not alter this perception. Hua is adamantly opposed to appeasement and appears to be imbued with the historic Middle Kingdom concept. Although China is insufficiently prepared for any direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, Hua's operational code would call for standing fast in border negotiations and on any matters of principle. Verbal confrontations throughout the world would be appropriate.

3. China's punitive invasion of Viet Nam was not in keeping with Hua's code. The purposes of the invasion are understandable and compatible with the code, however, the divergence exists in its unilateral nature. Hua continually emphasizes the need for unity and multilateral action. Although acting from a position of strength militarily (although this later came under question), China lacked the international (Third World) approval which occupies such a lofty position in Hua's code.

4. Every effort made to unify the Third World and increase China's prestige in that arena would be compatible with Hua's code. This would include aid and arms sales as part of a massive public relations campaign designed to promote China as the spokesman of the Third World.

5. Hua views power as being composed of military might, industrial capacity and most importantly, unity and backing of the population. Internally, policies of maintaining and/or improving the spirit of the population would be particularly compatible with his code. Such policies could include incentives, increased standard of living, greater educational opportunities and so forth.

6. A reassessment and restructuring of priorities to emphasize increased military capability would also be consistent with his code.

7. Hua will probably remain unobtrusive. This is simply his style. Speech making and traveling will be left to others. He is foremost an administrator, a moderator and a symbol of unity and stability. Hua Guofeng is a politically shrewd and orphic figure with a demonstrated ability to survive. He will be extremely difficult to muscle out of prominence.

C. LIMITATIONS

The operational code is not a flawless methodology. It is necessary to make certain assumptions whose absolute validity may never be definitely proven. The two most notable and potentially criticizable of these assumptions are first, that an operational code/belief system can be gleaned from an individual's expressions and second, that it can be derived from public utterances. It is not the author's intent to play the devil's advocate on this issue. Let it suffice to say that the literature runs abundant with arguments both pro and

con. What is important is to acknowledge that these assumptions are limitations upon the methodology itself, to certain corners of the political science and policy science fields.

This thesis utilized only public, English language primary sources in the construction of the operational code. Not only were the sources public, they were clearly those speeches and writings consciously chosen for release to the West and therefore of a propaganda nature. Additionally, as can be seen from Appendix A, few sources were available prior to Hua's emergence in 1975. Without a linguistic command of Mandarin Chinese, these limitations must be accepted. It is important to realize, however, that consciously or otherwise, Hua is portrayed to Western policy makers precisely in the manner delineated by this operational code. Irregardless of the public versus private statement controversy or the Chinese versus English source limitation, the Hua Guofeng the West is able to see is the Hua Guofeng of this thesis!

D. FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis provides valuable insight into the enigmatic Hua Guofeng and would be particularly useful with his emergence as uncontested ruler of the Peoples Republic of China. Yet, this thesis is merely a foot in the door. The following areas of research are necessary before the operational code can be utilized to its fullest in understanding/predicting Chinese decision making and in international relations in general:

1. The first priority should be the parallel construction of a Chinese language based operational code on Hua's early years. Editions of Hsin Hunan Pao are available from 1951-1960 which contain many Hua speeches and articles. Additionally, transcribed Changsha radio broadcasts are available covering the years 1963-1969. (130:3) Once constructed, the early Chinese code can be contrasted with the current English code (this thesis) to determine:

a. if the Hua portrayed to Western policy makers is, in fact, an accurate portrayal (i.e., the accuracy of this English source code)

b. if there have been any major changes in his code

c. the composite, total operational code of Hua Guofeng. This study is tailor made for a Naval Postgraduate School, area studies student with a Chinese language background and/or concurrent language specialty at the Defense Language Institute.

2. The second priority should be the construction of a parallel English operational code on Deng Xiaoping. The groundwork has already been accomplished by this thesis, leaving only the assembly of sources (available at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University) and coding. A comparison of Hua and Deng's operational codes would provide:

a. insight into inner Politburo factioning and general decision making in the Peoples Republic of China

b. a reference for evaluating who is on top, or who is spearheading which directives

c. an opportunity to ascertain how precisely the operational code construct can differentiate between similar typologies

d. insight into the numerous rise/falls of Deng, i.e., has his code changed between the three major periods: prior to the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976, 1977 to present

e. insight into the much publicized but poorly understood Hua-Deng rift.

3. The third priority should be the construction of operational codes on a broad spectrum of political leaders and elites i.e., the top members of the Soviet Politburo with an eye toward the succession question, Yasser Arafat, Ferdinand Marcos. This would be the first step toward detailed comparative analysis and the establishment of usable theoretical typologies. These analyses can be comparisons of contemporary figures; they can span history; they can be of leader types, countries, and so forth.

4. The fourth priority should be more research into the effects of role upon the operational code construct, especially the instrumental beliefs.

5. The fifth priority should be the periodic monitoring and update of Hua's operational code. This exercise is necessary for the following reasons:

a. to continually build on detail and the more subtle components of the code

b. to note any temporary deviations

c. to note any permanent changes

d. it is especially important to monitor the code closely during times of crisis when, theoretically, it has the highest probability of being adhered to.

6. The sixth priority should be research into the linkage between public and private views.

APPENDIX A

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION



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

Total Pages: 281

APPENDIX B

RELIABILITY TEST

The following questionnaire was given to ten coders as described in Chapter III. The results are as follows:

		Coder Response (percentage)	Author Response
A.	Conflictual	80	X
	Mixed	20	
	Harmonious	0	
	No Reference	0	
B.	Education/Communication	10	
	Eliminate Offending Nation	0	
	Eliminate Inequality	0	
	Balance of Power	0	
	Transform System	0	
	No Reference	90	X
C.	Destructionist	70	X
	Expansionist	30	
	Defensive	0	
	Conciliatory	0	
	No Reference	0	
D.	Destructionist	0	
	Expansionist	0	
	Defensive	90	X
	Conciliatory	0	
	Active Seeker of Peace	10	
	No Reference	0	
E.	Prepare Ground	70	X
	Try and See	0	
	Incremental	0	
	Blitzkrieg	30	
	No Reference	0	

overall 80% intercoder reliability

This exercise is intended to explore a political actor's operational code belief system. The code includes beliefs concerning the political universe, one's fundamental goals, the best strategy for achieving these goals, and a conception of what the opponent's goals are. Please read each statement and then select the best answer to the question which follows. Place an X next to the appropriate response. Do not infer anything. If there is no specific sentence or phrase in the statement which indicates the actor's belief, mark no reference. Disregard prior opinions about the countries involved.

A. But we cannot fail to see that imperialism and hegemonism, locked in their rivalry for world hegemony, are engaged in fervid arms expansion and war preparations and are carrying out agression and expansion everywhere, posing a grave threat to peace and to the security of all countries. Recently, the series of incidents which have occurred in the Near and Middle East and in Africa and Asia clearly demonstrated that their contention is daily intensifying and that the factors for war are visibly growing.

<u>What is the nature of the political universe</u>?

1. Conflictual ( ) The author indicates that the present international system is dominated by conflictual relations among nations or coalitions of nations.

2. Mixed ( ) There is reference to both conflictual and harmonious patterns of relations within the contemporary international system.

3. Harmonious ( ) The actor regards the contemporary international system as one in which mutual interests are dominant and are recognized as such.

4. No reference ( )

B. For its socialist construction, China needs an international environment of peace and a domestic situation of stability, unity and great order. We must highly treasure our unity, safeguard and strengthen it. The stronger our unity, the greater will be our strength and the better we shall be able to manage our affairs.

What are the conditions of peace?

1. Education/communication ( ) The author states that better education and information, or better communication between nations will allay the sources of conflict in the contemporary international system.

2. Eliminate offending nation(s) ( ) The author indicates that the necessary conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a specific nation or a class of nations.

3. Eliminate inequalities ( ) The author states that eliminating inequalities among nations will create the conditions of peace.

4. Maintain balance of power ( ) The author asserts that the best or only means of ensuring peace in the contemporary international system is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expansion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, etc.

5. Transform the system ( ) The author indicates that a significant change in the structure and functioning of the international system is required.

6. No reference ( )

C. Internationally, since the two hegemonist powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are locked in a fierce struggle for world domination, war is bound to break out sooner or later. The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country.

What are the opponent's goals?

1. Destructionist ( ) The opponent is believed to have virtually unlimited goals; such as universal hegemony, destruction

or radical transformation of the international system.

2. Expansionist ( ) The opponent is regarded as aggressive, but his goals fall short of total destruction.

3. Defensive ( ) The opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with his own security or maintenance of some status quo.

4. Conciliatory ( ) The opponent is viewed as ready and willing to undertake at least limited accommodation.

5. No reference ( )

D. In their rivalry for world hegemony the superpowers have reached out their hands everywhere, aggravating world tension. This calls for serious attention. We must heighten our vigilance and intensify our preparedness against war. We are opposed to appeasement. Together with people all over the world, we are determined to combat superpower hegemonism and upset hegemonist world strategic plans so as to put off the outbreak of a world war and defend world peace.

What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?

1. Destructionist ( ) The actor's goals are unlimited, including universal hegemony.

2. Expansionist ( ) Although the actor is active in the pursuit of interests, his goals fall short of total destruction, and do not include transformation of the international system.

3. Defensive ( ) The actor is primarily concerned with security and maintenance of the status quo. His quest for security may infringe on another's sovereignty and could even lead to destroying part of the opponent's nation. His concept of the status quo may also be open to question. However, he sees himself as primarily concerned with security instead of hegemony or territorial expansion.

4. Conciliatory ( ) The actor desires at least limited accommodation.

5. Active seeker of peace ( ) The actor desires to undertake major initiatives for peace.

6. No reference ( )

E. We believe that the outbreak of war can be put off, but then the people of all countries must close ranks, sharpen their vigilance, prepare against all eventualities, oppose appeasement, resolutely struggle against the war machinations of the superpowers and foil their strategic dispositions. In this way, even if the superpowers gamble with war, the people of the world will not be caught in a vulnerable state of unpreparedness.

What are the approaches to the pursuit of goals?

1. Prepare ground ( ) The actor believes that the best way to pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations.

2. Try and see ( ) The actor takes action as a way of testing what is feasible and what is not. It is not necessary or feasible to determine what the outcome will be.

3. Incremental ( ) The actor emphasizes the value of limited gains.

4. Blitzkrieg strategy ( ) The actor believes that the most effective strategy involves committing a major portion of one's resources and a full scale effort to deal with the problem.

5. No reference ( )

APPENDIX C

US vs USSR REFERENCES BY YEAR (PERCENTAGE)

		1975		1976		1977		1978		TOTAL	
		US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
What are the US/USSR's basic goals and aspirations?	Destructionist	100	100	23.4	71.4	28.6	40	66	75	33.5	64.5
	Expansionist			72.3	28.6	42.9	60	33	25	63.5	35.5
	Defensive					28.6				3.2	
What are the sources of the US/USSR goals?	Power Politics			100	33					33.3	11.1
	Ideology								60		33.3
	History				66	100		100	40	66.7	44.4
	Leader						100				11.1
What is the generality of US/USSR hostility?	Gen/Perm			100	100		100	80	83.3	77.8	87.5
	Spec/Limited					100	20	16.7		22.2	12.5
What are the US/USSR's decision making processes?	Model III						100		100		100
What is the US/USSR's approach to the choice of objectives?	Optimize			62.5					33	45.5	25
	Unrealistic			12.5				100	66	36.4	50
	Unflexible		100	25						18.2	25
What evidence is required for US/USSR to show good faith?	Withdraw					100		100	100	100	100

		1975 US	1975 USSR	1976 US	1976 USSR	1977 US	1977 USSR	1978 US	1978 USSR	Total US	Total USSR
How are the US/USSR and their actions described?	Interfere	25		6.9			25	40	18.2	12.5	12
	Arms Race					50	25			2.5	4
	War Preps	25	50	3.4		50	50			7.5	12
	Pygmy								9.1		4
	Most Dangerous	25		6.9					27.3	7.5	12
	Hegemonistic			27.6	75			60	27.3	27.5	36
	Soc/Imperialist								9.1		4
	Never Give Up			48	12.5					35	4
	Rivalry	25	50	3.4	12.5				9.1	5	12
What is the likely response of the US/USSR to our own conciliatory moves?	Ignore							100		100	
	Advantage Other						100				100
What is the US/USSR's view of conflict?	Desirable					100	50	50	100	33.3	60
	Inevitable						50	50		66.7	40
What is the likely response of the US/USSR to our policy of firmness?	Back Down				75						75
	Impulsive			100	25					100	25

APPENDIX D

RESPONSE TABULATION BY YEAR (PERCENTAGE)

Question	Response	1963	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	B*	A#
What is the nature of the political universe?	Conflictual Mixed			100	81.8 18.2	100	87.5 12.5	76.9 15.4	44.3 5.7
What is the nature of conflict?	Zero sum				100		100		100
What is the scope of conflict?	All Issues Linked Issues Separable				50 50	50 50		50 50	50 50
What is the role of conflict in historical development?	Necessary			100	100	100	100	100	100
What are the adversaries' basic goals and aspirations?	Destructionist Expansionist Defensive			100	57.9 36.8 2.1	30.8 69.2	66.7 33.3	61.9 33.3 4.8	50 50
What are the sources of the opponent's goals?	Ideology History Leader Power Politics				20 30 10 40	 50 50	50 50	20 30 10 40	37.5 50 12.5
What is the generality of the adversaries' opposition?	General/Permanent Specific/Limited			100	100	50 50	81.8 18.2	100	76.9 23.1
How will the adversary respond to conciliatory actions?	Ignore Advantage Other					 100	100		50 50

Question	Response								
What is the opponent's view of conflict?	Inevitable				100	50		100	40
	Desirable					50	100		60
What are the opponents' decision making processes?	Model III					100	100		100
How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?	Back Down				40			40	
	Respond Impulsively				60			60	
What is the opponent's approach to the choice of objectives?	Optimize				40		25	36.4	20
	Unrealistic				10		75	9.1	60
	Flexible				10			9.1	
	Unflexible			100	30	100		36.4	20
	Predictable				10			9.1	
What is the nature of the contemporary international system?	Conflictual			100	90.3	100	88.5	90.6	92.1
	Mixed				9.7		11.5	9.4	7.9
What are the basic sources of conflict?	Nat'l Attributes:Econ						3		2.2
	Int'l System:Ideology					15.4	6.1	14.8	4.4
	Int'l System:Nat'lism			33	57.7	30	24.2	59.3	24.4
	Int'l System:Economic				3.8	20	3	3.7	6.7
	Int'l System:Power Politics			66	19.2	40	63.6	22.2	57.8
What are the conditions of peace?	Educ/Communication			25		33.3	8.3	4	15.8
	Eliminate Offender					16.7			5.3
	Eliminate Inequalities			50	31.8		16.7	36	10.5
	Balance of Power			25	68.2	50	75	60	68.4
What is the structure of the international system?	Polarized			100				7.7	
	Pluralistic				100	100	100	92.3	100
How stable is the International system?	All Issues Linked				100		50	100	40
	High Spillover					100	50		60

Question	Response									
What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?	Defensive			75	70.8	90	76.5	69.2	82.8
	Conciliatory				4.2		23.5	3.8	13.8
	Modernize/Socialism			75	25	10		26.9	3.4
With respect to one's goals, should one be optimistic or pessimistic?	Optimistic/Unqualified				73.3	44.4	57.1	68.8	50
	Optimistic/Qualified			100	26.7	55.6	42.9	31.3	50
On whose side is time?	Own			100	100	100	100	100	100
Is the political universe predictable or capricious?	Predictable				100	100	100	100	100
What aspects of the political universe are predictable?	Historical Development				85.7	86.7	50	71.4	73.1
	Policy Outcome						20		7.7
	War			100	14.3		30	28.6	19.2
What is the degree of predictability?	Certain			100	100	100	90	100	92.9
	Probable						10		7.1
What is the role of the leader in shaping historical development?	Active			100	100	100	100	100	100
How are goals established?	Comprehensive Framework	100		100	100	100	100	100	100
What goals should be sought?	Optimal		100	50	80	50		66.7	66
	Feasible			50	20	50		33.3	33
How many paths are there to achievement of goals?	Single Path		100	100	100	100	80	100	91.8
	Multiple Paths						20		8.2

Question	Response								
Do value conflicts exist in the pursuit of goals?	All Goals Compatible						100		100
What strategies should be employed in the pursuit of goals?	Prepare Groud	100	100	100	70	100	50	78.6	69.2
	Try and See				10			7.1	
	Incremental				20		37.5	14.3	23.1
	Blitzkrieg						12.5		7.7
What is the strategy for pushing harder?	Unity				75			75	
	Anti-appeasement						66		66
	War Preparations						33		33
	Struggle				25			25	
What type of action is preferred?	Multilateral				100	100	100	100	100
How is risk assessed?	Within Framework						100		100
How important is timing in the achievement of major goals?	Important			100		100	100	100	100
	Not Important								
What tactics are most appropriate?	Learn from Foreign Countries				[illegible]	[illegible]	41.7	[illegible]	23.8
	Unity				86.7	77.8	41.7	86.7	57.1
	Peoples War					11.1			4.8
	Struggle				6.7		16.7	6.7	9.5
What is one's conception of power?	Military only				33				12.5
	Unity				33	33	50	50	37.5
	World Opinion						25		12.5
	Culture						25		12.5
	Allies					33			12.5
	Peoples War					33			12.5
	Manpower				33			50	

Question	Response	1963	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	B	A
What resources are available which enhance power?	Socialism					14.3	71.4		42.9
	Manpower				33.3	57.1	14.3	33.3	35.7
	Revolutionary Spirit				11.1	14.3		11.1	7.1
	Unity				33.3		14.3	33.3	7.1
	Determination				22.2			22.2	
	Area					14.3			7.1
What are the unavailable resources whose lacking inhibits power?	Underdevelopment				100		83.3	100	71.4
	No Modern Weapons					100	16.7		28.6

* Before Mao's death
\# After Mao's death

APPENDIX E

RESULTS OF TYPOLOGY COMPARISON (175:246)

P-1a Nature of Politics	Hypothesized Responses	Hua Guofeng	Kurt Schumacher
What is the nature of the political universe?	Conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace.	Highly conflictual; protracted in nature.	Conflictual. Conflict between contending forces is inevitable. View of the political universe as highly polarized between friends and foes.
What are the basic sources of conflict?	Warlike states or classes of states.	Superpower hegemonism driven by acute capitalist rivalry.	Nature of the adversary; the adversary's ideology.
What are the conditions of peace?	Containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors.	Elimination of capitalism (long run); elimination of bourgeoise (domestic); Third World united front to contain super-power hegemony/ balance of power (short run).	Eliminate the offending groups (this refers to Schumacher's views of domestic opponents).
What is the nature of conflict?	Zero-sum.	Zero-sum.	Zero-sum.
What is the scope of conflict?	Issues tend to be closely linked.	Inconclusive.	All issues are closely linked.

What is the role of conflict in historical development?	Very fucntional in some circumstances.	Very necessary and useful.	Necessary and inevitable.
Scenario of major danger of war.	War from miscalculation; "appeasement model."	Strongly opposed to appeasement. The only way to avoid war is to form a united front against the superpowers.	No reference. (but in domestic politics Schumacher opposed policies of cooperating or appeasing adversaries.)
P-1b The Adversary			
What is the nature of the adversary?	There is high correlation between the adversary's disposition and attributes (political or economic structures, nature of leadership, etc.), and its foreign policy. Adversary's actions result from careful planning (i.e. a Model I view of the adversary).	A general and permanent enemy. Model III image of USSR.	A general and permanent enemy. Model I image of enemy. Enemy is predictable.
What are the goals of the adversary?	Range from expansionist to destructionist; these arise from basic features of the adversary's regime.	Destructionist (USSR) Expansionist (US).	Destructionist (seeking to establish dictatorship).
How will the adversary respond to conciliatory actions?	Likely to view conciliatory actions as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment; adversary will be encouraged to pursue expansion; the "appeasement" models are highly relevant.	Conciliation is a form of appeasement which will always be taken advantage of.	Take advantage in other situations.

adversary respond to policies of firmness?	from pursuing expansionist policies. Danger of impulsive response by the adversary is minimal.	"paper tigers" and will back down when faced with a "united front."	situations; conflict is thus inevitable.
P-2 Optimism-Pessimism			
With respect to one's goals, should one be optimistic or pessimistic?	Optimistic about the long run. The short run is full of dangers, especially if one demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to pursue effective policies of deterrence.	High degree of optimism, primarily in regard to long term goals.	Unqualified optimist for the long run. Pessimistic for the short run, as there is an ever present danger of catastrophe.
Is optimism conditional?	Definitely. There is nothing automatic about one's ultimate success.	Yes.	Yes.
On whose side is time?	On one's own side, but this too is conditional.	Own.	One's own side in the long run, but this was mixed with a fear that enemy may become stronger.
P-3 Predictability			
Is the political universe predictable or capricious?	Political universe is relatively predictable; for example, the goals of the adversary are predictable, even if short run strategies may contain an element of surprise. Events rarely occur by chance, accident, etc. Major directions of historical development.	It is not only predictable, but in many cases it is irresistable. Firm believer in Marxism evolution.	Predictable.

what aspects of the political universe are predictable?		development (à la Marx).	development (but with some fears of how it might turn out if wrong path were chosen).
P-4 Control of History			
What is the role of the leader in shaping historical development?	Control over major elements of historical development is possible, but there are ever present dangers of losing control (e.g. inviting miscalculation by the adversary, owing to one's failure to make commitments sufficiently credible). Exercise of effective leadership obligatory.	A leader can and should guide history in the proper direction.	Need to act, and one's actions can make a significant difference. "One cannot simply depend on evolution and progress."
I-1 Selecting Goals			
How are goals established?	Establish political goals within a comprehensive framework; even seemingly disparate issues are closely linked.	To achieve a goal it is necessary to follow a "line" or framework.	Within a comprehensive framework; political issues are not separable.
What goals should be sought?	Seek optimal goals; compromises and withdrawals may be necessary in a given situation, but this should not occasion abandonment of important goals.	Optimal goals; never settle for less.	Optimal goals; do not settle for short term gains that may jeopardize basic goals.

there to the achievement of goals?	given time there is a single optimal path.	correct "line."	path.
I-2 Pursuit of Goals			
What strategies should be employed in the pursuit of goals?	Pursue goals vigorously when there are important gains to be made at the cost of the adversary. Limit means rather than ends when compromise or withdrawal necessary.	Prepare for all possibilities and pursue the goal step by step. Push your opponent only when you have the strength (allies).	Cannot modify or abandon the ultimate goal (of power for the party). Goals determine strategies, which determine tactics. Take the offensive against enemies.
What strategies are especially inappropriate?	Strategies of "muddling through," of trying this strategy and then that, in the hope that something will work.	No reference.	Accepting short run gains that fall short of ultimate goals and may jeopardize the latter. Shun an incrementalist strategy.
I-3 Coping with Risk			
How are risks assessed?		Within a comprehensive framework.	Within a comprehensive framework.
How are risks controlled?	By limiting means rather than ends.	No reference.	Avoid long term rather than short term risks.
How to deal with tradeoffs associated with risks?		No reference.	Pursue high risk policies, if necessary, in striving for ultimate goal. Do not settle for less than complete victory.

I-4 Timing of Political Action			
How important is timing in political action?	Timing is very important, lost opportunities for gains may not recur, and premature actions may unduly risk one's future prospects.	Very important; Seize opportunities as they arise.	Important for both achievement of major goals and for specific policy undertakings. Strike first when the enemy is weak; conflict is inevitable in any case. Mis-timing may result in catastrophe.
I-5 Utility of Various Means			
What tactics are most appropriate in what circumstances?	End justifies most, if not all, means.	United front against the superpowers.	Inextricably linked to goals and strategies. "Ridicule, rudeness and irony."
What is one's conception of power?	Do not hesitate to use force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.	Unity and support primarily; military capabilities are secondary.	(In domestic politics) power is the support of the majority; thus mobilize electorate and public opinion.

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